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PRIVACY, PRESS, AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
IN THE UNITED STATES
Amy Gajda*
Abstract: When the European Court of Justice in effect accepted a Right to Be Forgotten
in 2014, ruling that a man had a right to privacy in his past economic troubles, many suggested
that a similar right would be neither welcomed nor constitutional in the United States given
the Right’s impact on First Amendment-related freedoms. Even so, a number of state and
federal courts have recently used language that embraces in a normative sense the
appropriateness of such a Right. These court decisions protect an individual’s personal history
in a press-relevant way: they balance individual privacy rights against the public value of older
truthful information and decide at times that privacy should win out. In other words, they
recognize that an individual whose embarrassing past has been revealed by another can sue for
invasion of privacy in the United States, even when the historic information was once public.
This Article explores Right to Be Forgotten-sensibilities in United States jurisprudence and
suggests that such a Right has a foundation in historical case law and present-day statutes. It
argues that the legal conception of privacy in one’s past may have some limited practical and
important purposes but warns that any Right to Be Forgotten must be cabined effectively by
presuming newsworthiness—a word defined similarly in law and journalism—in order to
protect significant and competing First Amendment interests at a time when people in high
places have vowed to curb press freedoms.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 202
I. A HISTORY OF PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN IN THE UNITED STATES .......................... 204
II. A MORE MODERN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN............ 213
A. The Supreme Court and a Right to Be Forgotten ....... 213
1. Cox Broadcasting and Its Progeny ....................... 214
2. The Freedom of Information Act Cases ............... 221
3. Other Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Supreme
Court Cases ........................................................... 224
B. Right to Be Forgotten-Like Sentiments in Lower
Courts ......................................................................... 228
C. The Judicial Shift to Protect the Privacies of Life ...... 238
* The Class of 1937 Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School, a former journalist and
professor of journalism. Thanks to participants at the 2017 Privacy Law Scholars Conference in
Berkeley, California; the 2017 Free Speech & Media Law Forum in Budapest, Hungary; the 2016
Washington University First Amendment Roundtable; the 2016 Yale Freedom of Expression Scholars
Conference; and the 2016 Tulane Faculty Symposium for helpful feedback on earlier drafts. Thanks
to Agnieszka McPeak and David Meyer for helpful comments. Thanks also to Rachel Arrison,
Alexander Clarke, Stephanie Moore, Erin Morrissey, Peter J. Rogers Jr., Brett Schweinberg, and
Austin Spooner for research assistance. Finally, special thanks for very helpful editing and other work
by students at the Washington Law Review.

201

10 - Gajda.docx (Do Not Delete)

202

3/26/2018 11:16 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:201

D. Dahlstrom and a Right to Be Forgotten ..................... 243
E. Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Statutes .................... 247
1. Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Statutes and
Children ................................................................ 249
2. Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Statutes and
Adults ................................................................... 251
3. How Privacy-Protective Statutes Interact with a
Right to Be Forgotten ........................................... 253
F. Hassell v. Bird and the Order to Remove ................... 254
III. THE RIGHT SORT OF RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN:
A CLEARER FOCUS ON NEWSWORTHINESS ............... 256
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 263
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, a man in Pennsylvania filed an emergency request for an
injunction against two websites.1 The websites had suggested both that the
man had a criminal record and that he was a participant in the federal
witness protection program.2 In response, a state trial court ordered that
the websites be “immediately take[n] down, disable[d], and remove[d]”
from the internet.3
A few months later, after the defendant publisher appealed the order as
an unconstitutional restraint, the court decided that the websites could
remain online as long as the publisher removed any mention of the
plaintiff’s involvement in witness protection and any mention of his
criminal history.4 Revelations about the plaintiff’s criminal past and his
alleged participation in any protection program were so strongly invasive
of personal privacy, the court suggested, that the First Amendment
presumption against prior restraints did not apply: “[t]he United States
Supreme Court,” the judge hearing the case wrote, “has long held that
freedom of speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, does not
include all modes of communication of ideas” but must be balanced
against other interests, including the privacy protection of individuals.5
Moreover, the court reasoned, under Pennsylvania law, the disclosure
of certain once-public information could be punished and prohibited when

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Hartzell v. Cummings, No. 150103764, 2015 WL 7301962, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 4, 2015).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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a person’s “personal security” was at issue.6 The long-ago crime, the court
wrote, did not make the plaintiff a present public figure: the plaintiff did
not live his current life in the limelight of politics or celebrity, “and the
details about his past [were] likely not newsworthy twenty-five years after
the fact.”7 Similarly, the information about the plaintiff’s alleged
assignment in years past to a witness protection program had “no relation
to any public concern” and any relevant revelation was “personal, private,
and illegal.”8 The court then ordered that any information regarding the
man’s past be wiped off the websites.9
Just a few months later, a federal trial court in Washington, D.C. kept
information regarding a former prosecutor’s alleged misconduct out of
public hands, expressing similar concerns that the present release of past
information could harm the individual.10 In that case, however, the
potential danger seemed limited to the individual’s career: “without
question,” the court wrote, the former prosecutor “has a strong interest in
avoiding decades-old disclosures”11 and, in contrast, the public “has only
a negligible need to know about a largely unremarkable, decades-old
disciplinary proceeding” involving a man who was a public servant at the
time of the underlying investigation.12
Both of these recent decisions and others like them suggest that at least
some modern courts believe that individuals in the United States should
be able to keep their past histories private under certain conditions. In
short, they suggest that a Right to Be Forgotten—the notion that one
should have some right to privacy in one’s past and have some legal
remedy should that past be revealed—exists in modern United States
jurisprudence, a troubling notion given the First Amendment and press
freedoms.
This Article warns that these recent decisions are not anomalies and
that a Right to Be Forgotten effectively has been a part of United States
law since at least the dawn of privacy—from an 1890 law review article
titled The Right to Privacy13 and even before. The Article proceeds in
6. Id. at *4.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *7.
9. Id. It is true that the claim at issue was defamation and that, indeed, the state had issued a
document that the individual was not involved in witness protection. The court’s opinion, however,
seems purposefully vague and broad enough to suggest a case in which the information revealed is,
in fact, truthful.
10. Bloomgarden v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 12-0843, 2016 WL 471251, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 5,
2016).
11. Id. at *4.
12. Id. at *5.
13. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).

10 - Gajda.docx (Do Not Delete)

204

3/26/2018 11:16 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:201

three parts. First, it explores the history of privacy in the United States and
Right to Be Forgotten-like language and holdings included in older cases
and legal commentary. Second, it collects a surprising number of modern
cases from United States courts, including the nation’s highest court, that
support the idea that a Right to Be Forgotten exists on U.S. shores. This
second Part also notes longstanding Right to Be Forgotten-relevant
protections springing from statutory sources in state and federal law.
Finally, given this seemingly strong and troubling foundation for a Right
to Be Forgotten in the United States and what appears to be increasing
acceptance of such a Right in modern times, including court decisions that
order publishers to remove posted information, it argues that the Right
must be cabined by presuming newsworthiness, a word defined in
journalism’s ethics codes in a way that parallels at least in some part the
legal standard. Without such limitation, any Right to Be Forgotten will
significantly erode freedom of the press.
I.

A HISTORY OF PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN IN THE UNITED STATES

In 2014, the European Court of Justice decided that a man in Spain had
the right to wipe his long-ago financial woes off the internet.14 The
plaintiff, Mario Costeja González, complained that the continuing online
existence of a newspaper article about his debt proceedings ten years
earlier limited his ability to turn his life around after getting out of debt.15
The court sided with González finding that he had the right to the removal
of pieces of information about his past that were “inadequate, irrelevant
or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to th[e] purposes [for which
they were processed] and in the light of the time that has elapsed.”16
In other words, the man had what some have called a Right to Be
Forgotten or, less succinctly put, a right to put one’s embarrassing and
hurtful history behind him, at least with regard to a Google search.
Scholars now suggest that the European court’s decision created a “Right

14. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJ0131 21 (May 13, 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131 [https://perma.cc/4DA4-DFA4].
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id. at 19.
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to Erasure”17 or a “Right to Delisting”18 in Europe, which had already
protected privacy in the past and had punished privacy-invading
revelations.19
The precise definitions for each of those phrases is less important than
what the court embraced: the right to have one’s past wiped away because
of who the person has become. Ultimately, then, a Right to Be Forgotten
at least in some sense is what the court’s decision recognizes. It suggests
that an individual’s past history may indeed not be relevant to the person
of today; that past information may inadequately describe the person an
individual has become; and that an embarrassing history could be relied
upon to excess by someone who once knew an individual’s present
persona alone. The right of a past individual to be forgotten by people in
the present seems precisely what the European court suggested was
needed and appropriate.
After the decision, news media in the United States immediately
suggested that a similar outcome would not be possible here. A New York
Times article that year reflects what many suggested:
Ever since Europe’s highest court made the privacy ruling in
May, Google has fought to limit the impact of the decision to its
European operations, where an individual’s right to privacy is
often on par with freedom of expression. The opposite is true in
the United States.20
The suggestion that a Right to Be Forgotten was incompatible with
United States jurisprudence was put even more clearly by the
Philadelphia Inquirer:

17. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite
Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 435 (2014) (arguing that “protecting privacy
interests of data subjects requires regulation on the length of time and purposes for which businesses
can retain electronic information”).
18. See, e.g., W. Gregory Voss & Céline Castets-Renard, Proposal for an International Taxonomy
on the Various Forms of the “Right to be Forgotten”: A Study on the Convergence of Norms, 14
COLO. TECH. L.J. 281, 298 (2016).
19. A more expansive Right to Be Forgotten exists in Europe beyond erasure and delisting. The
European Convention on Human Rights Article 8, a provision titled “Right to respect for private and
family life,” necessarily embraces privacy in the past beyond internet erasure and delisting. European
Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. “Moreover,” the European
Court of Human Rights wrote in 2000, “public information can fall within the scope of private life
where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities. That is all the truer
where such information concerns a person’s distant past.” Rotaru v. Romania, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R.
111, 128.
20. Mark Scott, French Official Campaigns to Make ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Global, N.Y. TIMES:
BITS (Dec. 3, 2014, 3:20 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/french-official-campaignsto-make-right-to-be-forgotten-global/ [https://perma.cc/VJ9Y-QMYN].
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Do we have a “right to be forgotten”? Nope.
They do now in Europe. But will this “right” cross the Atlantic?
Not likely.21
The United States does, after all, have the First Amendment and its
promise of press freedom.22 And yet this Article provides evidence that
the essential elements of a Right to Be Forgotten have been a part of both
U.S. common law and statutory law for decades, in spite of constitutional
protections for the publication of truthful information.
The Right to Be Forgotten, then, has no need to cross the Atlantic; in
some ways, it has been on U.S. shores for centuries. In a surprising
number of cases, past and present courts have weighed privacy interests
against press interests and have decided that privacy wins out.
It is worth noting here that the birthdate of privacy law is a matter of
some dispute. Many believe that privacy law began in 1890 when Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy,23 a Harvard
Law Review article that criticized the press of the day for publishing
embarrassing tidbits about individuals and suggested that most
individuals should have the right to be “let alone.”24
But privacy sensibilities, and, notably here, a Right to be Forgotten type
of privacy, had existed even before 1890 in U.S. law. 25
The “Publicity Given to Private Life” section in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides evidence of these longstanding sensibilities.26
It suggests that liability is appropriate if a publisher reveals secrets about
another’s private life as long as the revelation “would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the public.”27
In other words, the Restatement suggests that the publication of truthful

21. John Timpane, Can the Internet Learn to Forget?, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 28, 2014, at A3.
22. There is disagreement over the expansiveness of the First Amendment, of course. Compare
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right
to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000) (arguing that “broader
information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing free speech law”), with Neil
Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2005)
(positing that arguments such as Volokh’s “overstate the First Amendment issues at stake in the
context of most database regulation proposals, because such proposals are not regulation of anything
within the ‘freedom of speech’ protected by the First Amendment”).
23. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13.
24. Id. at 195.
25. A few of these cases are highlighted later in this section. See also Amy Gajda, Privacy Before
the Right to Privacy: Truthful Libel and the Earliest Underpinnings of Privacy in the United States
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
27. Id.
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information can be punished as long as the information would be highly
offensive and not “newsworthy” to an average member of the public with
decent standards.28 Analogous to any Right to be Forgotten, the
Restatement states that individuals have some right to privacy in their
past. “Every individual has some phases of his life . . . and some facts
about himself that he does not expose to the public eye,” the Second
Restatement reads in its definition for private life.29
More specifically, the authors note that such private information can
include “some of his past history that he would rather forget.”30
Later, after suggesting that a lapse of time is something to be
considered in determining whether an individual has a privacy action
against an entity or a person who reveals information in an older public
record31—a publication that in the authors’ opinion may well satisfy the
elements of the publication-of-private-facts tort—the Second Restatement
offers a surprising example springing from Les Miserables:
Jean Valjean, an ex-convict who was convicted and served a
sentence for robbery, has changed his name, concealed his
identity, and for twenty years has led an obscure, respectable and
useful life in another city far removed. B Newspaper, with the
help of Police Inspector Javert, ferrets out Jean Valjean’s past
history and publishes it, revealing his present identity to the
community. As a result, Jean Valjean’s life and career are ruined.
This may be but is not definitely an invasion of privacy of Jean
Valjean.32
Such a revelation of a criminal past, the Restatement authors explain,
raises a “quite different problem” from current news coverage of crime.33
The former reveals the current identity and present location of an
individual who has changed his criminal ways and who might, therefore,
be more deserving of his privacy in order to facilitate rehabilitation.34
Importantly, this seems to include privacy in information that was once
public.
Like the Google Spain court, the Restatement thus suggests that
important privacy interests arise when older public records are published
about someone who has “resumed the private, lawful and unexciting life
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at cmt. b.
Id.
Id. at cmt. k.
Id. at illus. 26 (emphasis added).
Id. at cmt. k.
Id.
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led by the great bulk of the community.”35 Moreover, it seems, the
Restatement authors believed that additional information regarding the
individual’s “present location and identity” should strengthen privacy
claims.36 “[H]is new life is utterly ruined by revelation of a past that he
has put behind him,” the Restatement reads in its suggestion that
rehabilitated criminals, very likely a class with greater notoriety than
those who faced bankruptcy, deserve privacy protection.37 Perhaps the
Restatement authors did not realize that Jean Valjean in Les Miserables
had become a mayor and, therefore, was a public official to boot; perhaps
they did.
This Right to Be Forgotten-like language in the Second Restatement,
an important part of the current foundation of privacy law in the United
States, was not created out of thin air. In fact, it is likely that the Second
Restatement authors acknowledged the potential importance of such a
Right because it had existed in U.S. law for decades.38
Even before 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published
The Right to Privacy,39 some courts had held that individuals have a right
to privacy in embarrassing past information and, accordingly, that those
who publish it can be held accountable.
Consider a case from Louisiana decided in 1884.40 There, the defendant
had published a pamphlet suggesting that a priest had had numerous
affairs with nuns, students, and others over the course of twenty-five
years.41 The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the defendant publisher’s
conviction for publishing that information, finding that even if the
information were true, jurors could well find that the information had been
published for less than “good motives and justifiable ends.”42 Using
language that literally included the word “forgotten,” the court noted
specifically that past acts—including criminal acts—should be cloaked in

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Note here that the authors rely on common law in their formulation of the Restatement
provisions.
39. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23.
40. State v. Bienvenu, 36 La. Ann. 378 (La. 1884).
41. Id. at 378–79 (author translation). The pamphlet stated:
[F]or over twenty-five years, the Rev. Cyprien Venissat, by indecent and notorious acts
and other prurient acts attested to by eyewitnesses, has violated his vows of chastity and
has become a subject of shame, scorn and scandal . . . We hereby declare that [he] is guilty
of touching, caressing, embracing and indecently kissing the students and nuns of his
convent and other women. He is also guilty of seduction and adultery.
42. Id. at 382 (author translation).
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privacy, even in a case involving a priest presumably well known to the
community:
Indeed, that would be a barbarous doctrine which would grant to
the evil-disposed the liberty of ransacking the lives of others to
drag forth and expose follies, faults or crimes long since forgotten,
and perhaps expiated by years of remorse and sincere reform,
with no other motive than to gratify hatred or ill-will by blasting
the character and reputation of their victims. Such is not the law
of Louisiana.43
In doing so, the court rejected the defendant’s constitutional arguments
based upon its freedom to publish truthful information as “utterly
unfounded.”44 It affirmed the judgment against the publisher and refused
a rehearing.45
Earlier cases have similar sentiments. In 1803, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found a newspaper liable for publishing information that
suggested that a clergyman had had a past dalliance with a parishioner.46
In finding for the clergyman, the court lamented that many misunderstood
“liberty of the press” to mean that the press could publish what it wanted.47
Here, the court found specifically that the matter concerning the
clergyman’s past was “improper for public examination” and ruled
against the newspaper.48 The basis for the court’s decision was not that
the information was untruthful and defamatory, but that it was out of
bounds and essentially unfair. In 1808, Massachusetts’s high court
similarly suggested that the publication of a critical history of a man’s
dealings with another was inappropriate and explained that “if the
publication be true, the tendency of it to inflame the passions, and to excite
revenge . . . may sometimes be strengthened.”49
The United States Supreme Court expressed a related sentiment in 1845
in a case involving a letter critical of a public servant’s past work. There,
the Court wrote, publications that harm a man’s “sympathetic and social”
nature could rightly be the subjects of litigation.50 Using that reasoning,
therefore, even someone who was a candidate for public office would
arguably have had a cause of action against the publisher of truthful
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. (emphasis added) (author translation).
Id. (author translation).
Id. at 383.
Runkle v. Meyer, 3 Yeates 518 (Pa. 1803).
Id. at 519.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 168 (1808).
White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266, 285 (1845).
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information as long as that information was “calculated to make [an
individual] infamous, or odious, or ridiculous.”51 The publisher of such
matter, the Court wrote, would properly face liability because the article
had impaired personal happiness and social order.52
Therefore, when a Texas court wrote in 1878 that it was a wellestablished doctrine that it would be tortious to suggest that another was
“notoriously of bad or infamous character” even though such information
were true,53 enough common law history supported such an assessment.
Courts had suggested as much for at least seventy-five years.54
Twelve years after the Texas court’s decision, Warren and Brandeis
expressed similar sentiments in The Right to Privacy.55 The article argued
for a privacy right that would give most individuals a legal claim against
an entity that had published their “private affairs” about personal and
family life,56 an argument that was, of course, broad enough to include
liability for the publication of information about one’s past life.
Language in the article that more clearly supports a Right to Be
Forgotten is found in the authors’ references to European commenters and
court decisions. For example, when discussing an individual’s privacy
rights in general, Warren and Brandeis quoted French law, suggesting that
it supported the notion that “the wholesale investigations into the past of
[even] prominent public men” is a privacy invasion and that “all the
details of private life . . . shall not be laid bare for inspection.”57 Warren
and Brandies concluded that “[s]ome things all men alike are entitled to
keep from popular curiosity.”58 The authors also highlighted a British case
in which the court suggests that older letters from a deceased individual
should be protected “in after life” for privacy reasons.59
By 1931, then, when a California appeals court heard a case involving
a former prostitute who had long since changed her ways to live an
“exemplary, virtuous, honorable, and righteous life,”60 it was clear who
would win the invasion-of-privacy claim she had brought against the
filmmaker who had outed her. Had the publisher’s story of the once51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Suggesting that such information, therefore, would not be in the public interest. Id. at 290–91.
Id. at 291.
Morton v. State, 3 Tex. App. 510, 518 (1878).
See Gajda, supra note 25.
It is not clear why the authors do not rely on these older cases, as noted later in this Part.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 213.
Id. at 216 n.1 (emphasis added).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 201 n.1.
Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
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prostitute stopped with the exploration of the incidents in the woman’s
past life without more, the court wrote, there would be no possible cause
of action.61 Instead, the filmmakers “went further, and in the formation of
the plot used [her] true maiden name . . . in connection with the true
incidents from her life . . . .”62 Therefore, the court found, the onceprostitute had a viable cause of action; the publishers had wrongly
revealed the current identity of one with a past, someone who had
rehabilitated her life:
This change having occurred . . . she should have been permitted
to continue its course without having her reputation and social
standing destroyed by the publication of the story of her former
depravity with no other excuse than the expectation of private
gain by the publishers.63
The California case involving the former prostitute’s Right to Be
Forgotten-like right to privacy became a part of William Prosser’s
Privacy,64 the law review article published in 1960 that collected and
analyzed prior privacy-relevant case law and one that, like the 1890’s The
Right to Privacy before it, became a cornerstone of privacy law in the
United States. In the article, Prosser highlighted the case as one that stood
for the principle that an individual’s past public life can indeed again
become private.65 Initially calling the lapse of time’s effect on a privacy
claim a “difficult question,” Prosser suggested that “[t]he answer may be
that the existence of a public record is a factor of a good deal of
importance, which will normally prevent the matter from being private,
but that under some special circumstances[,] [even that] is not necessarily
conclusive.”66
Later in the article, Prosser noted that liability for such publication
regarding an individual’s embarrassing past was a “troublesome question”
which had not yet been uniformly resolved.67 Past history is important, he
wrote, and “[t]here can be no doubt that . . . the revival of past events that

61. Id.
62. Id. at 93.
63. Id. See also Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (criminal
reenactment from year before created valid invasion of privacy claim).
64. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
65. Id. at 392, 396, 419.
66. Id. at 396.
67. Id. at 418. This seems to reflect in part the holding of Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806
(2d Cir. 1940), a case in which the court found that a recluse’s past life as a child prodigy made him
properly the subject of current interest.

10 - Gajda.docx (Do Not Delete)

212

3/26/2018 11:16 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:201

once were news[] can properly be a matter of present public interest,”68
but he also noted that there seemed to be some limitation in U.S. law on
such exploration and revelation.69 “All that can be said,” Prosser wrote,
“is that there appear to be situations in which ancient history cannot safely
be revived.”70
In 1971, eleven years after Prosser’s assessment of Right to Be
Forgotten-like privacy interests in the United States, California became
even more specific with regard to the privacy in one’s criminal past. In
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest,71 the state’s highest court held that
rehabilitated individuals had some right to privacy in their past crimes. In
the case, Reader’s Digest had published a mention of a carjacking that had
occurred eleven years before, naming the man who police arrested and
describing his crime.72 Certain family members and friends, unfamiliar
with Marvin Briscoe’s criminal past, abandoned him when they learned
the truth.73 He then sued Reader’s Digest on privacy grounds.74 The court
sided with Briscoe. “Unless the individual has reattracted the public eye
to himself in some independent fashion,” the court wrote with regard to
the balance between the newsworthiness of the underlying information of
the long-ago crime and the once-criminal’s right to privacy, “the only
public ‘interest’ that would usually be served is that of curiosity.”75 It
suggested that the rehabilitation of those with criminal records was more
important than the republication of a crime that had occurred many years
before.76
In 1977, six years after Briscoe was decided, when Prosser was a
Reporter for the Second Restatement, he and his co-authors included the
language in the Restatement quoted earlier in this section, suggesting that
people in the United States have privacy in some “past history that [they]
68. Prosser, supra note 64, at 418.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 419 (emphasis added). Prosser may have been influenced by Miller v. NBC, 157 F. Supp.
240 (D. Del. 1957), as well. In that case, the plaintiff sued after a television program reenacted his
bank robbery victimization. Id. at 241. The court suggested that liability could well have ensued had
the program named the plaintiff. Id. at 243. Here, it “did not identify plaintiff in his present setting
with that incident out of [the] past.” Id. The court noted specifically that its opinion “should not be
interpreted as sanctioning the unbridled appropriation of an individual’s intimate history merely
because it has once been exposed to public view.” Id.
71. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
72. Id. at 36.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 40.
76. Id.
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would rather forget,”77 including the potential for a right to privacy in past
crimes, and offering the Jean Valjean outing example as a potentially
viable claim for publication of private facts.78 After all, since at least the
early 1800s, several courts, including California’s highest court, had
suggested as much: there was a Right to Be Forgotten-like right to privacy
in one’s past and that the Right included even information that was once
decidedly public.79
II.

A MORE MODERN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN

A.

The Supreme Court and a Right to Be Forgotten

It is of some consequence that in 2004, the Supreme Court of California
effectively reversed its decision in Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest. The 2004
decision, Gates v. Discovery Communications,80 involved a television
documentary about a murder for hire that had occurred twelve years
before. There, the court reviewed United States Supreme Court precedent
and suggested that a line of Supreme Court cases, including Cox
Broadcasting v. Cohn81 and Bartnicki v. Vopper,82 “fatally undermined”
Briscoe’s holding.83 “[T]he [United States Supreme Court] has never
suggested . . . that the fact the public record of a criminal proceeding may
have come into existence years previously affects the absolute right of the
press to report its contents,” the court wrote.84 The California court ruled
in favor of the television program producers and against the man whose
criminal past had been broadcast as a part of the program.85

77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
78. Id. at cmt. k, illus. 26.
79. See also Bernstein v. NBC, 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955). There, the court rejected a
plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy based upon a televised depiction of his past crimes. Id. at 819.
In doing so, however, the court noted that the once-criminal had not been named. Id. at 819–20. After
quoting from several successful invasion-of-privacy cases in which the plaintiffs had won, the court
suggested that those plaintiffs had been identified by name. Id. at 828–29. It wrote:
This court agrees that we are not so uncivilized that the law permits, in the name of public
interest, the unlimited and unwarranted revival by publication of a rehabilitated wrongdoer’s past
mistakes in a manner as to identify him in his private setting with the old crime and hold him up
to public scorn.
Id. at 828.
80. 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
81. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
82. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
83. Gates, 101 P.3d at 559.
84. Id. at 560.
85. Id. at 563.
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A review of those landmark U.S. Supreme Court opinions—Cox
Broadcasting and Bartnicki—and the similarly archetypally pro-media
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,86 however, suggests that there is some flexibility
among the Justices with regard to a Right to Be Forgotten. In other words,
the California Supreme Court’s language in Gates describing Supreme
Court precedent in the negative—that the Court had never suggested that
the press has no right to publish one’s criminal past—may have been the
strongest synthesis of Supreme Court cases it could muster. The Supreme
Court has also never held explicitly that no Right to Be Forgotten exists.
1.

Cox Broadcasting and Its Progeny

While many read Supreme Court cases that address the clash between
privacy rights and press rights as decidedly favoring the press, the
language within them is not so simple. Consider Cox Broadcasting v.
Cohn,87 for example. That case concerned a 17-year-old rape victim who
had been murdered.88 The defendant in the case was a television station
that had reported her identity after learning of it through indictment papers
made available in court.89 A Georgia statute at the time made the
identification of a rape victim a misdemeanor.90 The journalist-defendants
argued that the statute was unconstitutional; they maintained that news
media should never be liable civilly or criminally for publishing accurate
information, even when that information is damaging to “individual
sensibilities.”91 But the Court refused to grant media such a broad waiver.
Instead, it held only that when publication is based upon “judicial records
which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which
themselves are open to public inspection,”92 there would usually be no
liability.
“[A]scertaining and publishing the contents of public records are
simply not within the reach” of a tort action for invasion of privacy based
upon publication of private facts, the Court wrote.93 Moreover, it noted,
“[p]ublic records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned

86. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
87. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
88. Id. at 471.
89. Id. at 472–73.
90. Id. at 471–72.
91. Id. at 489.
92. Id. at 491. Throughout, the Court very much focuses on the public nature of the record. See id.
at 494.
93. Id. at 494–95.
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with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed
by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media,”94
suggesting that the Justices would not want to punish or prevent the
publication of information made generally available to the media by the
government itself.95
The ultimate holding in Cox Broadcasting is therefore quite limited:
“the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press
to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in
official court records,”96 the Court wrote, and “[o]nce true information is
disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press
cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.”97 The Court also maintained that
its decision was a narrow one, pointedly refusing to extend the reach of
Cox Broadcasting beyond the facts in front of it.98 In the end, therefore,
the case held only that the publication of truthful information recently
released to the public by the government through official public records
cannot be sanctioned.99
Moreover, and of special significance here, language in Cox
Broadcasting at the same time embraces privacy. Consider the following
passage in light of the Court’s ultimate conclusion that media cannot be
punished for publishing information made available to the public by the
government. Consider too its pointed nod to the 1890 Warren and
Brandeis article:
[T]here is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual, a zone
within which the State may protect him from intrusion by the
press, with all its attendant publicity. Indeed, the central thesis of
the root article by Warren and Brandeis was that the press was
overstepping its prerogatives by publishing essentially private
information and that there should be a remedy for the alleged
abuses.100
And this:

94. Id. at 495.
95. Id. at 496.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 491. The Court wrote that rather than addressing broader questions, it was “appropriate
to focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy that this case presents, namely, whether
the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained
from public records.” Id.
99. See id. at 496 n.26, 497 n.27.
100. Id. at 487 (citation omitted) (noting too that “[m]ore compellingly, the century has experienced
a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy”).
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In this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of
the free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society.101
In other words, it seems that Cox Broadcasting itself recognizes that
sometimes the press will overstep its bounds by reporting truthful but
private information and that in those cases, media liability can be
appropriate and presumably constitutional—and, finally, that well-rooted
“tradition” dictates as much.
A decade later in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,102 the Court was similarly noncommittal with regard to overarching press protections. In that case, a rape
victim sued the Florida Star newspaper after it published her name.103
Again, a statute was in place that punished the publication of such a
victim’s identity.104 And again the Court refused to hold media liable
under the circumstances, those in which the newspaper had obtained the
victim’s name from an official report placed in the open-access
pressroom.105
Noting specifically once again that its holding was “limited,”106 the
Justices wrote that “only that where a newspaper publishes truthful
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the
highest order”107 and that under the circumstances of the case—one in
which the government itself had released the victim’s name to the media
in a publicly accessible location despite its power not to108—liability
against the newspaper was inappropriate.109
Notably, the Court again specifically refused to grant the media’s
request for broader protections for the publication of all truthful

101. Id. at 491.
102. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
103. Id. at 526.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 540.
107. Id. at 541. For an explanation of narrow tailoring, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
395 (1992). In R.A.V., a case involving a statute that prohibited cross burning, the Court focused on
the statute’s purpose of allowing those who have been discriminated against to live in peace and
suggested that the First Amendment did not allow “special hostility” toward even reprehensible
particular speech. Id. at 396. “The ‘danger of censorship’ presented by a facially content-based
statute,” the Court wrote in that case, “requires that that weapon be employed only where it is
‘necessary to serve the asserted compelling interest.’” Id. at 395.
108. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535.
109. Id. at 541.
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information,110 including the Court’s surprising specific rejection of
protection for media in cases with similar facts.111 In doing so, the Court
once again reinforced the importance of an individual’s privacy rights:
We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically
constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal
privacy within which the State may protect the individual from
intrusion by the press, or even that a State may never punish
publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense.112
Indeed, the Justices wrote unequivocally that “[w]e . . . do not rule out
the possibility that, in a proper case, imposing civil sanctions for
publication of the name of a rape victim might be so overwhelmingly
necessary to advance [government] interests” that liability would be
constitutional.113 Here, however, the Court was concerned in some part
with the negligence per se standard in the statute—a standard that the
Justices suggested would cause liability to flow directly from publication
no matter the important factual nuances at issue, including whether the
victim’s identity was currently known by many in the community.114 The
Court was also troubled that the statute also punished only publication by
“mass communication” and not individual gossip, suggesting that the
consequences of the latter may be even more devastating.115
In other words, Florida Star suggests that there could well be times in
which liability even for the publication of the name of a rape victim would
be appropriate and constitutional.116 The decision, described in the Court’s
own language, does not stand for the principle that all publication of
truthful information is protected.
Finally, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,117 a 2001 case pitting privacy interests
against press interests, the Court again found in favor of media but also
again refused to grant the press the freedom to publish any truthful
information that had been made available to it.118 In Bartnicki, the radio
110. Id. at 532.
111. Id. at 541.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 537.
114. Id. at 539.
115. Id. at 540.
116. I have argued this in past law review and news media articles. See also Michael J. Kelly &
David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 33 (discussing Cox Broadcasting
and B.J.F. v. Florida Star and noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has not broadly decided either to
always protect privacy or always protect the First Amendment without restriction in the case of
publicizing the identity of a victim of sexual assault”).
117. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
118. Id. at 534.
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station defendant had played on air a surreptitiously recorded telephone
conversation it had received in the mail anonymously. 119 A voice on the
tape suggested that violence would be in order to help influence a
contentious teachers’ union negotiation.120 Based in part upon those facts,
the Supreme Court consciously framed the issue in front of it very
narrowly: “[w]here the punished publisher of [newsworthy] information
has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but
from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish
the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a
chain?”121
In Bartnicki, the answer was no: there would be no liability on the part
of this particular radio station publisher.122 First, the information itself, the
Court decided, was newsworthy.123 In deciding as much, however, the
Justices suggested that not all truthful information would be of similar
designation, noting that an individual’s privacy interests could well justify
punishment for publication of “domestic gossip or other information of
purely private concern.”124 The case at bar, in contrast, involved the
publication of information that proved that someone had suggested
violence would be appropriate in teachers’ union negotiations—a matter
of “unquestionabl[e]”125 “public importance”126 in which public interest
concerns clearly weighed more strongly in the balance than privacy
interests.127
Second, the Court noted that the radio station’s hands were clean. It
was, instead, “a stranger’s illegal conduct”128 in recording a private cell
phone conversation that had created the tape. The station, in contrast,
merely published something newsworthy it had received anonymously.129
Moreover, in rejecting liability for the radio station, the Justices noted
that they had “repeated[ly] refus[ed]” a broader holding that would allow
the press the right to publish anything truthful that it wished.130 The
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 517–18.
Id. at 518–19.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 529.
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majority quoted language from Florida Star to explain that such repeated
refusals and narrow holdings in this line of cases were necessary because
of the “sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes
between the First Amendment and privacy rights.”131
In fact, the Court raised what it called a “still-open question,” one that
suggested the possibility for media liability in cases in which media’s
hands were not so clean: “whether, in cases where information has been
acquired unlawfully by a newspaper . . . government may ever punish not
only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.”132
Ultimately, the Court decided only that “a stranger’s illegal conduct does
not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a
matter of public concern.”133
Justice Breyer, in concurrence, put it even more strongly with regard to
the radio station’s decision to air the tape of the callers’ conversation:
“[h]ere, the speakers’ legitimate privacy expectations [were] unusually
low, and the public interest in defeating those expectations [was]
unusually high . . . . [Therefore,] the statutes’ enforcement would
disproportionately harm media freedom.”134
He suggested also that “the Constitution permits legislatures to respond
flexibly to the challenges future technology may pose to the individual’s
interest in basic personal privacy.”135 In other words, in Justice Breyer’s
assessment, too, media’s choice to publish private facts about an
individual would not always win constitutionally.
It is true, then, as the Gates court noted, that “the high court has never
suggested . . . that the fact the public record of a criminal proceeding may
have come into existence years previously affects the absolute right of the
press to report its contents.”136 Consider the corollary, however, as seen
in Cox Broadcasting, Florida Star, and Bartnicki. The high court has also
never expressly suggested that publishers do in fact always have the right
to reveal truthful information, including information about one’s past, no
matter how far back it goes. In fact, as the 2004 California decision in
Gates notes, the United States Supreme Court “did not expressly overrule
Briscoe” in Cox Broadcasting, even though the Court mentioned the

131. Id.
132. Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted). A question that a federal appeals court would
later answer in the affirmative, in a case explored in a later Part. See infra section II.D.
133. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535.
134. Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 541.
136. Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 560 (Cal. 2004).
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Briscoe case in its decision and effectively could have.137 In fact, the Court
cites Briscoe only once, and in a way that aligns well at least in part with
Cox Broadcasting’s own holding: writing that Briscoe stands for the
proposition that “the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not
require total abrogation of the right to privacy.”138
Moreover, in Cox Broadcasting, the Court specifically noted that a case
involving other types of less accessible government records, such as
juvenile criminal records, could well raise different constitutional
questions. “We mean to imply nothing about any constitutional questions
which might arise from a state policy not allowing access by the public
and press to various kinds of official records,” the Court wrote, “such as
records of juvenile-court proceedings.”139
If it is a still open question, then, as the Court suggested, whether courts
can punish media for publishing truthful information acquired illegally,
then the question standing alone suggests that some information may have
greater privacy significance, and that such information could include
government records kept out of public circulation. Juvenile criminal
records, it seems, deserved at least special mention with regard to privacy
interests, key here because they contain truthful information about the past
and are traditionally kept private.140
Of additional note, California’s high court itself limited its holding in
Gates, the opinion that overruled Briscoe, thereby suggesting that there is
still at least some potential privacy in one’s past in California. The court
wrote only that, in its estimation, privacy lawsuits could neither be based
upon “facts obtained from public official court records”141 nor upon
information “from public official records of a criminal proceeding.”142
The use of the decidedly limiting words “public” and “criminal” here is
of some note. Even Gates, therefore, leaves open the question of whether
one has a Right to Be Forgotten-like right of privacy in one’s older, nonpublic—perhaps juvenile or expunged—criminal records. It also leaves
open the question of whether non-public, civil records could be the basis
for a claim. Finally, it does not address whether one might have a similar
137. Id. at 560 n.5.
138. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 474 (1975).
139. Id. at 496 n.26.
140. When the United States Supreme Court wrote in a different context in Snyder v. Phelps that
matters of public concern meant information that is the “subject of legitimate news interest . . . and of
value and concern to the public,” its definitional language was limited in line with its prior holdings:
“legitimate” news that is of “value” to the public and that which raises some matter of public
“concern.” 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011). In doing so, it again rejected a sweeping definition that would
include all truthful matters that publishers themselves had decided were of interest to the public.
141. Gates, 101 P.3d at 560 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
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right in historic embarrassing or deeply private information about one’s
life not found in any official government record at all.
By the time of the Gates decision in 2004, in fact, the United States
Supreme Court had also effectively recognized the importance of similar
types of privacy in cases outside the context of publication. Beyond Cox
Broadcasting, Florida Star, and Bartnicki, there is language from the
Supreme Court that quite specifically recognizes the value of a right to
privacy in one’s past.
2.

The Freedom of Information Act Cases

Although similar sentiments appear elsewhere in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, it is in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)143 cases that
the Court has used its strongest language that supports at least in part a
Right to Be Forgotten.144 Two key decisions, United States Department of
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,145 decided in
1989, and National Archives v. Favish,146 decided in 2004, concern access
to government documents, though not later publication. Both decide that
it would be painful for some to revisit the past, and hold that protection
against such harm is an important part of privacy considerations in the
United States. In both, moreover, worries about the present impact of
information about a past crime is at some issue.
In Reporters Committee, journalists had asked for so-called “rap
sheets” of four organized crime suspects who allegedly had had dealings
with at least one member of Congress.147 The government refused to
release the rap sheets—reports containing the individuals’ separate
criminal histories—and the Justices agreed that the information should not
be released.148
The Court quoted with approval the trial court’s assertion that there was
no need to “balanc[e] [the] privacy interest against the public interest in
143. FOIA is the federal statute that gives public access to government documents and other
information. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). It does, however, contain several exemptions that keep multiple
documents out of public hands. One of special note here is the provision that exempts “personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy” from disclosure. Id. § 552(b)(6).
144. See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US
Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 171 (2012) (discussing cases regarding public records
and the Freedom of Information Act and suggesting that “[o]utside the context of newsworthy stories,
U.S. courts have been less inclined to insist on unrestrained access to information”).
145. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
146. 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
147. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757–58.
148. Justices Blackmun and Brennan concurred in the judgment.
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disclosure,” as “the invasion of privacy was ‘clearly unwarranted.’”149 “It
seems highly unlikely that information about offenses which may have
occurred 30 or 40 years ago . . . would have any relevance or public
interest,” the Court noted, again quoting the trial court.150
The Supreme Court’s own language was similarly strong. It rejected
the journalists’ argument that crimes detailed in a rap sheet could not be
private because they had once been public, calling such a notion a
“cramped notion of personal privacy.”151 The Justices then cited Warren
and Brandeis’s 1890 article The Right to Privacy for the proposition that
“the passage of time” can in fact render something that was once public,
private again.152 They also suggested that the Freedom of Information
Act’s privacy provisions, including the provisions that protect certain
information from revelation, reflected Congress’s understanding that
“significant privacy interests” were at stake in information that would
include the compilation of public criminal records.153
Important here, the Justices in Reporters Committee also rejected the
proposition that there would be some news value or proper public interest
in an individual’s criminal past, noting instead that “rap sheets reveal only
the dry, chronological, personal history of individuals who have had
brushes with the law, and tell us nothing about matters . . . that are
properly the subject of public concern.”154 Such protection for one’s
criminal history is especially necessary in the computer age, the Court
suggested, because the substantial privacy interests in a rap sheet become
even more critical when technology “can accumulate and store
information that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long
before.”155
In what Justice Blackmun in his concurrence called a “bright line”156
approach by the Court in Reporters Committee, then, the Justices
protected rap sheets quite categorically. After noting that “[t]he privacy
interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet information
will always be high,” with privacy at its apex and public interest at its
lowest when the subject is a “private citizen,” the Court wrote:157
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 758.
Id. at 758 n.11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 766 n.18 (emphasis added).
Id. at 771.
Id. at 780.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, we hold as a categorical matter that a third party’s
request for law enforcement records or information about a
private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen’s
privacy, and that when the request seeks no “official information”
about a Government agency, but merely [seeks] records that the
Government happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is
“unwarranted.”158
Two years later, in Favish, a unanimous decision that refused a FOIA
request for death scene records and one in which the Court recognized a
family’s privacy in death photographs, the Justices again suggested that
historic facts could be protected because of present privacy concerns. In
doing so, they quoted with approval an 1895 decision that respected the
“well-established cultural tradition acknowledging a family’s control over
the body and death images of the deceased,” one that, in the Justices’
opinion, reflected the common law more generally:159
It is the right of privacy of the living which it is sought to enforce
here. That right may in some cases be itself violated by
improperly interfering with the character or memory of a
deceased relative, but it is the right of the living, and not that of
the dead, which is recognized. A privilege may be given the
surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory,
but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings, and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased.160
Here too is the suggestion that a decedent’s survivors have a privacybased right to effectively curate the past by suppressing some painful
elements to preserve others. “Family members,” the Court wrote, “have a
personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to
unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief,
tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased
person who was once their own.”161
And here too the Court specifically mentioned its worries that
technology could extend the longevity of information, making the past
more accessible in the present and impacting privacy by doing so. 162
Family members, the Court explained, “seek to be shielded . . . to secure

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
National Archives v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2003).
Id. at 168–69 (emphasis added) (citing Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895)).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 167.
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their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of
mind and tranquility.”163
Moreover, the Court in dicta seemingly extended the right to privacy
to situations involving the publication of such images, citing with
approval a case in which a mother had had a successful claim for privacy
in the publication of a photograph of her dead child164 and an example
from the Restatement that validates a publication-of-private-facts cause of
action when a newspaper publishes a photograph of a dead infant.165
There are similar sentiments in Department of the Air Force v. Rose,166
a case in which the Court refused to automatically release older
information identifying once-cadets’ ethics and honor code violations
even though the information had years before been released more publicly
at the Air Force Academy.167 The Court again worried about the damage
this dated information could cause. “[T]he risk to the privacy interests of
a former cadet, particularly one who has remained in the military,” the
Court wrote, “cannot be rejected as trivial.”168 Here, the Court noted
specifically, those who once had the knowledge could well have
“forgotten” about the cadet’s disciplinary encounter with school
administrators.169 Therefore, it decided, information from the past could
in some cases be protected on privacy grounds.170
3.

Other Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Supreme Court Cases

There are additional examples of Right to Be Forgotten sensibilities at
the Court: outcomes and language in cases involving once-public figures
turned private individuals, involving school disciplinary records of young

163. Id. at 166.
164. Id. at 169 (citing Bazemore v. Savannah Gen. Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930)).
165. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
166. 425 U.S. 352 (1976); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. a, illus. 7
(AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“A gives birth to a child with two heads, which immediately dies. A reporter
from B Newspaper asks A’s permission to photograph the body of the child, which is refused. The
reporter then bribes hospital attendants to permit him, against A’s orders, to take the photograph,
which is published in B Newspaper with an account of the facts, naming A. B has invaded A’s
privacy.”).
167. Id. at 381.
168. Rose, 425 U.S. at 379.
169. Id. at 380–81 (“Despite the summaries’ distribution within the Academy, many of this group
with earlier access to summaries may never have identified a particular cadet, or may have wholly
forgotten his encounter with Academy discipline.”).
170. In the end the Court upheld the appropriateness of an in camera review of the files that
balanced public interest against those privacy interests. Id. at 381.
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people, and involving the rights of the press to publish historically correct
but privacy-invading information.
In Time v. Firestone,171 decided the same year as Rose, the Court held
that a woman who had once been married to the “scion” of a very public
family—namely, the Firestones of tire fame—could presently be
considered a private person despite very strong media interest in her in the
past.172 The underlying defamation case decided by the Court, one
springing from the publication of incorrect sordid details of Mary Alice
Firestone’s divorce after a short marriage, held that she was not a public
figure and that her divorce was not a public controversy.173 She “did not
assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society,” the
Court wrote, and “did not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular
public controversy in order to influence the resolution of issues involved
in it.”174
The holding arguably shares sensibilities with a Right to Be Forgotten
in some sense. Mary Alice Firestone had been the subject of strong
newspaper coverage from the time of her wedding in 1961, the pinnacle
of interest in her as an individual, to the time of her filing for divorce in
1964, a time of more waning public interest.175 Her wedding to Russell
Firestone was covered by The New York Times176 and dozens of large and
small newspapers across the United States.177 A significant number of
those newspapers had included photographs of the couple, a sign of the
story’s newsworthiness and of her own public prominence through
marriage.178 The reported theft of her $250,000 wedding ring some
months later again thrust her into the news as an individual.179 Still later,
more local coverage focused on a car crash in which she was injured180
and the hearing in which she was adjudicated incompetent to care for her

171. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
172. Id. at 457.
173. Id. at 454.
174. Id. at 453.
175. Id. at 454.
176. Russell Firestone Jr. Weds Mary Sullivan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1961, at L33.
177. This information is the result of searches on Newspapers.com, ProQuest Newspapers, and
America’s Historical Imprints. Because the databases are incomplete, there was likely significant
additional coverage in newspapers that are not included in these databases.
178. See, e.g., Rubber Heir Weds, IND. GAZETTE, Aug. 3, 1961, at 12. The photograph’s cutline
indicates that it was sent out over the Associated Press wire, a further indication of the newsworthiness
of the story.
179. See, e.g., Hunt Gang in Theft of $250,000 Diamond, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1963, at 39.
180. Mrs. Firestone’s Condition Poor, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 8, 1964, at 2.
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personal interests because of alleged mental health problems.181 This
coverage indicates some continuing media interest in her in the years
between her marriage and the time in which she filed for divorce.
Yet, the Court in Time v. Firestone decided that Firestone’s highprofile divorce did not cause her to suddenly become a public figure
again.182 In other words, despite significant earlier media interest in her as
an individual during her marriage, by the time of the actual divorce
proceedings in 1967, she was again a private figure in the eyes of the
Court. Arguably, therefore, there was some privacy right to her past even
though she was once well known publicly; private figures have greater
privacy rights than do public figures and she had seemingly become
private again given the passage of time.
Consider too Doe v. McMillan,183 a case involving a report drafted by
Congress in the 1970s that contained disparaging personal information
about public school students, including individual students’ absences, test
results, and disciplinary problems.184 Justice White’s lead opinion echoed
the plaintiffs’ concerns about the impact the revelation of such
information would have on their future careers.185 But it was Justice
Douglas’s concurrence that more firmly noted the distinct, later privacy
interests in these childhood records, warning of the “potentially
devastating effects” to the individuals should such information about the
past be revealed later in life:
[M]isdeeds or indiscretions may be devastating to a person in later
years when he has outgrown youthful indiscretions and is trying
to launch a professional career or move into a position where
steadfastness is required.186
Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the appellate court had refused
to enjoin the publication of such privacy-invading information contained
in the congressional report only because “no republication or further
distribution of the report was contemplated,”187 suggesting that it would
181. Appointed as Guardian, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 18, 1964, at 2 (photograph and cutline).
182. Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
183. 412 U.S. 306 (1972).
184. Id. at 308.
185. Id. at 309.
186. Id. at 329 (Douglas, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 310 n.5 (majority opinion); see also United States v. Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
In Sells Engineering, the Court suggests that even though information has been revealed publicly,
privacy arguments are not moot and privacy should be protected. “We cannot restore the secrecy that
has already been lost,” the Court wrote, “but we can grant partial relief by preventing further
disclosure.” Id. at 423 n.6 (quoting the appeals court decision, 642 F.2d 1184, 1187–88 (9th Cir.
1981)).
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have otherwise enjoined the publication. Here, too, then, the Court
embraced the right to privacy in past information in at least some sense.
It is true that in 1971, the Court decided in a defamation-related case
that information concerning the alleged criminal past—“no matter how
remote in time or place”—of a candidate for public office “can never be
irrelevant” to a candidate’s fitness for office.188 A candidate who runs on
family values or a sterling reputation, the Court suggested, “cannot
convincingly cry ‘Foul!’ when . . . an industrious reporter attempts to
demonstrate the contrary.”189 But even in such a case involving a
politician, the Court suggested, line-drawing is difficult and the question
whether there might be some information that would be off limits was an
open one.190
Even when the Court protected the press after publication of
information regarding juvenile offenders in Oklahoma Publishing v.
District Court of Oklahoma191 and Smith v. Daily Mail,192 its holdings
were purposefully limited. In the former, members of the press had
learned the identity of a juvenile criminal defendant because they had been
allowed into the courtroom by the judge.193 Given that the state itself had
given the media the information without restriction, the later publication
would be protected by the First Amendment.194 In Daily Mail, media had
learned similar information from a police radio broadcast and from
eyewitness interviews, and the Court held similarly that the newspaper
had the right to publish on those grounds.195 “[T]here is no issue of
privacy” or “unlawful press access to confidential judicial proceedings”
on the facts, the Court wrote, noting again specifically that it holding was
“narrow.”196
By 2001, then, when the Court decided Bartnicki in a way that once
again left open the possibility for a valid invasion-of-privacy claim based
upon the publication of truthful information that was sufficiently private
and not newsworthy, there was some basis on which to conclude that that
piece of “private” information could in fact include something that had
happened in one’s past—and that that information could have once been
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971).
Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.
430 U.S. 308 (1977).
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
Oklahoma Publ’g, 430 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 312.
Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105.
Id.
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known publicly at least in some sense.197 Through dicta and otherwise,
language from the Court is strong enough and the threads are seemingly
pervasive enough to suggest some foundation for a Right to Be Forgotten
even at the nation’s highest court.
B.

Right to Be Forgotten-Like Sentiments in Lower Courts

As indicated at the start of this Article, modern lower courts have also
held or have at least suggested that individuals have some privacy
interests in once-public matters that have faded from the spotlight. Recall
the Pennsylvania man with the court-described non-newsworthy criminal
record and the Justice Department official who earlier had been under
some sort of investigation, both individuals whose pasts were protected
on privacy grounds in Right to Be Forgotten-relevant decisions.
Consider as another example a well-known privacy case from 1983 that
very nearly precisely describes the Right.198 There, Toni Diaz, the female
president of a California community college’s student body, sued the
Oakland Tribune for revealing that she had had gender affirming surgery
and that her birth certificate had identified her as a male.199 The California
appeals court in Diaz v. Oakland Tribune200 reversed the judgment in
favor of Diaz because of faulty jury instructions.201 In doing so, however,
the court decidedly favored the plaintiff and, in effect, a Right to Be
Forgotten.
First, the court decided that Diaz’s birth certificate identifying her as a
male thirty-six years before, and her arrest record approximately eight
years before in which police identified her as a man, did not make her onpaper once-male gender a public fact.202 Instead, the court found that her
state-imposed identity as a male could remain private because, in part, she
had kept it a secret ever since her gender affirming surgery several years

197. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
198. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 139 Cal. App. 3d 118 (1983). Admittedly, the appellate court
decided Diaz before the California Supreme Court’s holding in Gates v. Discovery Communications,
101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004), a case discussed in section II.A, but the facts are only marginally parallel,
and the Gates court does not mention the Diaz case in its decision at all.
199. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. at 124.
200. 139 Cal. App. 3d 118 (1983).
201. Id. at 131.
202. Id. at 132.
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before,203 even though some of her life had been spent as a male at least
in some sense.204
Second, the court held that a jury could indeed find that her gender
affirming surgery—the fact that she had been identified as a male who
then became a female in body when she was thirty-three years old—was
not newsworthy.205 “Defendants enjoy the right to publish information in
which the public has a legitimate interest,” the Diaz court wrote.206 Here,
even though Diaz was a college leader, her gender reassignment surgery
did not reflect anything about “her honesty or judgment,”207 the court
noted, suggesting that only that sort of information regarding a student
body president would be newsworthy.208
Finally, the court decided that the $775,000 verdict handed down by
the jury against the newspaper (approximately $2,320,000 in today’s
dollars209) was not excessive.210 “The evidence of Diaz’s emotional
distress and suffering” and her “emotional trauma,” the court wrote, “was
uncontradicted.” It found that such a damages award would be appropriate
under those circumstances,211 even though the defense had argued in
response to the verdict that Diaz had spent only $800 on related medical
care.212
In its decision, the court distinguished Cox Broadcasting, finding it of
“little guidance.”213 “Importantly,” the court wrote, Cox Broadcasting
“expressly refused to address the broader question of whether the truthful
publication of facts obtained from public records can ever be subjected to
civil or criminal liability.”214 Here, even though the information used by
the newspaper to out Toni Diaz was contained within a public birth
certificate and a public arrest record, the court found that the revelation of

203. Id.
204. Id. at 123. Diaz testified that she always knew that she was female, however, even in early
childhood.
205. Id. at 134.
206. Id. at 127 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The court cited two cases, including
Briscoe, and the Restatement of Torts as supporting that conclusion.
207. Id. at 134.
208. Id.
209. US INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/.
210. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 137.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 131.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
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such long-ago facts could indeed be the “ever” moment to which the
Supreme Court referred.
Put another way, in some sense, Antonio Diaz, born 36 years before,
had been given the Right to be Forgotten by the court. She had become
Toni Diaz, and she had been given the right to sue the entity that had
revealed a deeply personal secret from the past.
Consider also Haynes v. Knopf, Inc.,215 a case decided ten years after
Diaz.216 There, the Seventh Circuit suggested that memoirs about the past
containing information that a plaintiff “would rather forget”217 could spark
a successful publication-of-private-facts lawsuit; some historically
accurate but embarrassing information would be too deeply private,
painful, and shocking if revealed in another’s memoir, including
“titillating glimpe[s] of tabooed activities,”218 “intimate physical
details,”219 “intimate medical procedure[s]”220 and graphic information
about another’s sex life.221
While fact patterns in additional cases vary, perhaps most striking and
surprising is Right to Be Forgotten-like sensibilities found in cases
involving the images captured by authorities when individuals are
arrested. In these freedom-of-information cases, an individual’s mugshot,
routinely published by some news outlets in 2018, is protected on privacy
grounds because of the potential for later harm. These courts suggest, as
did the Diaz court, that there is some privacy worthy of protection even in
criminal records because of the potential for abuse by those who may
reveal it in the future.222
Consider the 1999 decision by a federal district court in Louisiana
withholding a public figure’s arrest photograph.223 “[M]ug shots generally
disclose unflattering facial expressions,” the court suggested, and
“preserve[] in [their] unique and visually powerful way, the subject’s
215. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1233.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1234.
220. Id. at 1232.
221. See id. at 1232.
222. See Sarah E. Lageson, Crime Data, the Internet, and Free Speech: An Evolving Legal
Consciousness, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 8, 9 (2017) (examining the legality of such databases and
online repositories of criminal information and arguing that “the unfettered public distribution of
criminal justice data reinforces structural inequalities already present in criminal justice institutions,
reifying relationships of power and patterns of punishment—of which understanding of law plays a
key role”).
223. Times Picayune Publ’g v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472 (E.D. La. 1999).
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brush with the law for posterity.”224 Just because such a photograph may
be in government files, and was at one time routinely released by
government officials, the court reasoned, does not mean that the
individual loses privacy interests in it.225
Moreover, and decidedly relevant here, the court found that a public
figure’s mug shot—the booking photograph at issue was that of the owner
of the San Francisco 49ers who had plead guilty to limited involvement
in a government corruption case—may be even more deserving of
protection because of the potential for later misuse by rivals in business.
Each new publication in the future, the court worried, would cause his
renewed embarrassment or discomfort about his past indiscretions.226
That same year, the Eleventh Circuit wrote quite broadly in a related
decision that “individuals have a substantial privacy interest in their
criminal histories.”227
Those cases are not outliers. In 2012, the Tenth Circuit held that
criminal detainees’ mug shots should be protected because of the potential
for future revelations.228 There, the court repeated its worries about the
future use of past images: “a mug shot’s stigmatizing effect can last well
beyond the actual criminal proceedings,” it wrote.229 It then upheld the
trial court’s decision that suggested that “[c]ommon sense dictates that
individuals desire to control dissemination of any visual depictions of
themselves and consider such visual depictions ‘personal matters.’”230
In that 2012 decision, the Tenth Circuit noted that only one federal
appellate circuit—the Sixth—had concluded the opposite: that no privacy
rights exist in mug shots because the public interest in criminal matters
outweighed the individual’s privacy.231 In late 2015, Sixth Circuit judges,
recognizing a groundswell, however, voted to hear en banc a case in which
U.S. marshals had refused a media request for the booking photographs
of four Michigan police officers.232 “Individuals do not forfeit their
interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public
in some form,” the Sixth Circuit panel had written earlier in suggesting
224. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 479.
227. O’Kane v. U.S. Customs Serv., 169 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999).
228. World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012).
229. Id. at 828 (quoting Times Picayune Publ’g, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (emphasis added)).
230. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32594, at *40 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2011) (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 828 (citing Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93 (6th Cir. 1996)).
232. Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 14-1670, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20224 (6th
Cir. Nov. 20, 2015).
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that the court’s nearly two decades-old decision deserved en banc
review.233
Once again, the court’s worries had special relevance to a Right to Be
Forgotten. The en banc court specifically noted that “booking photographs
often remain publicly available on the Internet long after a case ends,” 234
writing specifically that the court’s earlier 1996 outlying decision
favoring the release of mug shots was made pre-Google, when the court
had likely failed to “account[] for Internet search and storage
capabilities.”235
Not surprisingly, given that language and those worries about the future
impact of today’s information, the Sixth Circuit in 2016 joined other
federal courts and decided that mug shots could be kept out of public
hands when privacy interests outweigh public interests.236 Using words
and ideas that suggested the court’s concern that “forgotten”237
information that had “disappeared”238 would be revived to “haunt”239 an
individual for “decades,”240 it sent the case back to the trial court to
balance the private and public interests at stake.241 Such word choice
suggested strong protection for most mug shots, put best in a Right to Be
Forgotten-like context by a concurring judge:
Twenty years ago, we thought that the disclosure of booking
photographs, in ongoing criminal proceedings, would do no harm.
But time has taught us otherwise. The internet and social media
have worked unpredictable changes in the way photographs are
stored and shared. Photographs no longer have a shelf life, and
they can be instantaneously disseminated for malevolent
purposes. Mugshots now present an acute problem in the digital
age: these images preserve the indignity of a deprivation of
liberty, often at the (literal) expense of the most vulnerable among
us. Look no further than the online mugshot-extortion business.
In my view, [the Sixth Circuit’s 1996 decision] . . . has become

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 796 F.3d 649, 652 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Id.
Id. at 652 n.1.
Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 482 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989)).
Id.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id.
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“inconsistent with the sense of justice.” These evolving
circumstances permit the court to change course.242
Even the dissenting judges in the case, distressed at how the majority
opinion had overturned longstanding case law and concerned that it had
“deprive[d] the public of vital information about how its government
works and [did] little to safeguard privacy,”243 suggested that a “sensible
balance” might be achieved between “reputational concerns and the free
flow of public information.”244 They then cited to two Right to Be
Forgotten-like law-based considerations: one a proposed Georgia statute
that would have required website owners to remove acquitted individuals’
mugshots from webpages and, the second, a Pennsylvania decision that
suggested the false light tort—a privacy tort similar to defamation but
with a focus on the offensiveness of the incorrect information rather than
on its harm to reputation—would be appropriate should a mugshot of an
individual whose criminal record had been expunged be published on the
website bustedmugshots.com.245 In effect, then, the dissenting opinion in
the Sixth Circuit en banc opinion, signed by seven federal appellate court
judges, also makes a case for a Right to Be Forgotten.
There are additional examples of Right to Be Forgotten-like outcomes
within a criminal context in very recent decisions. The 2015 Pennsylvania
case involving the man with a criminal record alleged to have been a part
of the federal witness protection program is one.246 There, with regard to
decades-old information about the man’s criminal past, the court
suggested that the publication of such information had been done to harass
the plaintiff and that it, therefore, was not protected.247 “Although courts
justifiably fear that restrictions on publication may have a chilling effect
on the disclosure of future information,” the court wrote, “the present case
does not present a scenario in which the right to freedom of information
is threatened.”248 Such information about one’s past was, instead, to the
court’s mind, “personal, private, and illegal information that ha[d] no
relation to any public concern.”249 The court ordered the information

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
2015).
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 486 (Cole, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id. at 494 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Hartzell v. Cummings, No. 150103764, 2015 WL 7301962, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 4,
Id. at *18.
Id. at *17–18
Id. at *18.
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removed from websites, finding its relevance less important than the
man’s interests in privacy.
The year before, in the false light case noted by the Sixth Circuit dissent
in the mugshots case,250 a Pennsylvania federal court had decided that a
man whose mug shot was published on bustedmugshots.com and
mugshotsonline.com had a potentially valid claim for false light even
though he had in fact been arrested years before—an arrest that had been
expunged.251 The website had argued in part that the accuracy of the mug
shot and its release by authorities years earlier after the man’s arrest had
made a false light claim impossible—after all, he had indeed been arrested
and the mug shot was indeed that of the plaintiff—but the judge
disagreed.252 “The questions here are questions of fact,” the court wrote,
“and [the plaintiff’s claim for false light] . . . is not implausible.”253
Outside the criminal context, recall the 2016 case that suggested that
the investigation into a federal prosecutor’s alleged misconduct could be
kept out of public hands.254 In that Freedom of Information Act case, the
court specifically wrote that the former prosecutor “without
question . . . has a strong interest in avoiding decades-old disclosures that
would likely cause him professional embarrassment.”255 The passage of
time, the court noted specifically, did not materially diminish the man’s
substantial privacy interests.256
In Toffoloni v. LFB Publishing Group,257 a case decided by the
Eleventh Circuit in 2009, the court similarly gave support to principles
underlying a Right to Be Forgotten. There, the court found a valid rightof-publicity claim in old nude photographs of a female professional
wrestler that had been published in Hustler magazine after her murder.258
In doing so, the court specifically noted the importance of protecting
present privacy interests in older truthful information about an individual:

250. Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 494 (6th Cir. 2016) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting).
251. Taha v. Bucks Cty., 9 F. Supp. 3d 490 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
252. Id. at 494.
253. Id.
254. Bloomgarden v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2016 WL 471251 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2016); see also
Bloomgarden v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 212 F. Supp. 3d 122, 125 (D.D.C. 2016), a later proceeding in
which the court reiterates protection for the letter and suggests that there is negligible public interest
in “decades-old agreements.”
255. Bloomgarden, 2016 WL 471251, at *4 (emphasis added).
256. Id.
257. 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009).
258. Id.
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[Hustler] would have us rule that someone’s notorious death
constitutes a carte blanche for the publication of any and all
images of that person during his or her life, regardless of whether
those images were intentionally kept private and regardless of
whether those images are of any relation to the incident currently
of public concern. We disagree.259
Instead, the court wrote, courts had consistently ruled that “there are
timeliness . . . boundaries that circumscribe the breadth of public scrutiny
to the incident of public interest.”260 In cases involving crimes, the court
suggested that that might well be the period between the time the criminal
is caught and when he faces justice in the courtroom.261 In other words,
the court arguably and, if so, troublingly suggested that shortly after an
individual is convicted or found not guilty, the matter could well no longer
be of public concern.262 A reasonable timeliness boundary in the case
before it, the court repeated throughout the opinion, would not include
Hustler’s publication of photographs that “were at least twenty years old,”
especially when the murder victim when alive had “sought destruction of
all of those images.”263 A decision in favor of publication, the court
suggested, would “open the door to [the publication of] any truthful
secret” about an individual’s past or otherwise and that privacy here had
greater value.264
“‘[A] person who avoids exploitation during life,” the court wrote in
Toffoloni, quoting an earlier court, “is entitled to have his image protected
against exploitation after death just as much if not more than a person who
exploited his image during life.’”265 In other words, the court suggests that
those who have acted to protect their past during their lifetimes have
privacy interests that continue into the present and even after death.

259. Id. at 1210.
260. Id. (emphasis added).
261. Id.
262. The court wrote that during the:
[P]endency and continuation of the investigation, and until such time as the perpetrator[s] of the
crime may be apprehended and brought to justice under the rules of our society, the matter will
continue to be one of public interest, and the dissemination of information pertaining thereto
would not amount to a violation of [appellant’s] right of privacy.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Tucker v. News Publ’g Co., 397 S.E.2d
499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)).
263. Id. at 1211.
264. Id. at 1212 (citing Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981)).
265. Id. at 1213 (emphasis omitted) (citing Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am.
Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982)).
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Related protection for privacy rights in the past—especially as
regarding information about the long-ago death of a relative—also appear
in a recent California case. In 2012, the Ninth Circuit held that parents
have “a constitutionally protected right to privacy over [a] child’s death
images,” when those images had been taken decades before.266 There, a
prosecutor who had handled a child’s murder case had kept the autopsy
photographs. Years later, he gave one to a journalist doing a follow-up
news story about the crime.267 “[T]his is the first case to consider whether
the common law right to non-interference with a family’s remembrance
of a decedent is so ingrained in our traditions that it is constitutionally
protected,” the court wrote.268 “We conclude that it is.”269 The United
States Constitution, the court explained, “protects a parent’s right to
control the physical remains, memory and images of a deceased child
against unwarranted public exploitation . . . .”270 Such protections were
especially important, the court noted, “given the viral nature of the
Internet, where [parents] might easily stumble upon photographs of [their]
dead son on news websites, blogs or social media websites.”271 The court
decided that future government officials could be liable for depriving
surviving family members to their “substantive due process right to family
integrity” and privacy interests should they reveal autopsy photographs,
including decades-old photographs, in a similar way.272
Other relevant examples include a 2005 Washington decision in which
a plaintiff had a valid privacy claim in medical information that involved
in part a medical condition diagnosed when he was a child, later leaked

266. Marsh v. Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012).
267. Id. at 1152.
268. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added).
269. Id.
270. Id. (emphasis added).
271. Id. at 1155.
272. Id. at 1154; see also Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 181 Cal. App. 4th 856, 864
(2010) (“[A]s cases from other jurisdictions make plain, family members have a common law privacy
right in the death images of a decedent, subject to certain limitations.”). Also relevant is Tatum v.
Dallas Morning News, 493 S.W.3d 646, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015). There, the court similarly held that
parents had a valid defamation claim against a journalist who had reported that their son had
committed suicide, and who had noted critically that the obituary suggested instead that the death was
from a car accident. Id. at 652–53. Even though the underlying facts as presented in the publication
were basically true, albeit critical of the grieving parents, the court sided with the parents who argued
that they believed the suicide had been caused by the accident and that they had wanted to honor their
son’s memory by not including “morbid details” or “overly scientific information” about his death.
Id. at 663. In other words, the court gave the parents the ability to bring a defamation claim based
upon their preferred understanding of the past, one that apparently did not align with police records,
and one giving them at least some apparent right to forget the police assessment of how their son died.
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by his employer;273 a 2010 Texas case in which the state supreme court
held that state employees’ dates of birth can be protected as private
information;274 and a 2014 Illinois decision in which the court found that
students have privacy interests in the historical information in their
student files.275
In 2011, the Washington State Supreme Court justices wrote rather
succinctly en banc that they were “not persuaded that a person’s right to
privacy . . . should be forever lost because of media coverage.”276 Even
though identifying information involving a police officer in an
“unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct” had been published in
the media and more broadly, the court held that revelation of his identity,
even though it named him in the opinion itself, would be “highly offensive
to a reasonable person.”277
Of at least some evidence of the potentially increasing viability and
breadth of a Right to Be Forgotten in the United States, consider that
throughout reported case history only thirty-two courts have quoted the
somewhat surprising Restatement language that suggests that there is a
privacy right in one’s past history that he would rather forget.278 Four of
those cases, more than 10% of them, were decided in 2015 and later, and
in each the language is not discounted but embraced as drawing a
definitional line appropriate to privacy.279 In 2017, for example, a federal
trial court in Kansas ruled against a former Wichita State vice president’s
privacy claim that sprang from a public announcement about his
impending termination.280 The court wrote that such employment-related
information was “not the kind of private information [traditionally]
entitled to . . . privacy . . . .”281 “[F]acts that are considered suitably
private,” the court explained in contrast, involve sexual relations,
273. White v. Town of Winthrop, 128 Wash. App. 588, 116 P.3d 1034 (2005).
274. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen., 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010).
275. John v. Wheaton Coll., No. 2-13-0524, 2014 Ill. App. Lexis 1045 (Ill. Ct. App. May 20, 2014).
276. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 172 Wash. 2d 398, 412, 259 P.3d 190, 196
(2011); see also United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that sealed briefs
or closed court proceedings that may have implicated grand jury material could be protected from the
press, and that newspapers had no constitutional or common law right to these materials).
277. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wash. 2d at 413–15, 259 P.3d at 197–98.
278. Research done in November 2017 (on file with author).
279. Roman v. United Illuminating Co., CV146044689S, 2015 Conn. Super. Lexis 1096 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 12, 2015); Jane Does v. King Cty., 192 Wash. App. 10, 366 P.3d 936 (2015); Predisik
v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 346 P.3d 737 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
280. Robinson v. Wichita State Univ., No. 16-cv-2138-DDC-GLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83577
(D. Kan. May 31, 2017).
281. Id. at *16–17.
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humiliating illnesses, and “some of [a man’s] past history that he would
rather forget.”282
It is important to note that several recent courts have explicitly rejected
Right to Be Forgotten-like arguments. In 2015, the Second Circuit, for
example, refused to find that a woman could bring privacy-based claims
against online media that continued to report her arrest that had been, in
effect, nullified.283 Connecticut’s erasure statute, the court wrote, “creates
legal fictions” but “does not render historically accurate news accounts of
an arrest tortious merely because the defendant is later deemed as a matter
of legal fiction never to have been arrested.”284 And a federal trial court in
New York that same year opened once-sealed documents that had been
part of litigation five years before.285 “[T]here is no implication in the
caselaw or in common sense why the passage of more than three years
should disable a journalist from seeking [the] unsealing” of an otherwise
sealed file, the court wrote.286
Even so, a meaningful number of cases embrace the notion that
individuals have a right to privacy in older, previously public information.
Very likely, as reflected in some of the language above, the shift toward
privacy in past information over publication rights is based in part upon
judges’ growing worries about the longevity of information in today’s
internet age.
C.

The Judicial Shift to Protect the Privacies of Life

In 1975, in Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, the Supreme Court noted that it
found the “strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy”
compelling.287 Two years later, in Whalen v. Roe,288 the Court wrote that
it had special privacy concerns about the computerization of information
and information storage. “We are not unaware,” the Justices explained,
“of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of
personal information in computerized data banks or other massive

282. Id.
283. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015).
284. Id. at 551. See also Lovejoy v. Linehan, 20 A.3d 274 (N.H. 2011), a case involving the
revelation of a sheriff candidate’s annulled assault conviction. The court concluded that the annulled
record was of public concern. Id. at 278.
285. In re Pineapple Antitrust Litig., 04 md. 1628 (RMB)(MHD), 2015 US Dist. LEXIS 122438
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
286. Id. at *7.
287. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975).
288. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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government files.”289 Much of the stored information, the Justices noted
specifically, is “personal in character and potentially embarrassing or
harmful if disclosed.”290
In other words, at the nation’s highest court at the start of the computer
age, there was the sense that personal privacy was becoming increasingly
vulnerable. Moreover, there were concerns about older, stored,
embarrassing or deeply private information and what might be done with
it should someone gain access.
Forty years later, in 2014, when the Court expressed concerns about
police access to the information contained in a cellular phone—calling the
material stored there the “privacies of life”291—the shift toward privacy
was even clearer.
The United States Supreme Court is not alone in its worries about
technology and its sensitivities regarding life’s privacies.292 In recent
years, there seems to be a growing sense among many courts that the
mounting vulnerability of privacy posed by modern technology and
information-sharing demands stronger legal protection. This has led some
courts to overcome traditional deference to journalists in deciding what
should be considered “newsworthy” and to hold that individual privacy
should be protected, even when the counterweight is the publication of
truthful—and, arguably, newsworthy—information.293
Two recent examples that show the courts’ growing confidence in
deciding questions of newsworthiness involve public figures from the
sports world. In both, the plaintiffs brought publication-of-private-facts
lawsuits against publishers of certain medical information. In both, the
public figures won the right to continue their privacy causes of action,
despite defense arguments that the information at issue was newsworthy
and, therefore, the cases warranted immediate dismissal.
In the first, a reporter for ESPN tweeted a report that a New York
Giants football player, Jason Pierre-Paul, had needed a finger amputation
289. Id. at 605.
290. Id. The Court specifically expressed concern with “the unwarranted [intentional or
unintentional] disclosure of accumulated private data.” Id. at 606.
291. Riley v. California, __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
292. See Andrew Neville, Is It a Human Right to Be Forgotten? Conceptualizing the World View,
15 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 157, 171 (2017) (arguing that the Right to be Forgotten, or at least the
right to have one’s personal information delisted in search engine results, is a human right that is
increasingly encroached upon due to modern technology; noting that “[t]he Internet has created a
world where information is stored and shared even when international governments consider it to be
irrelevant by statute”).
293. For a fuller exploration of this topic, see AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW
PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015).
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after an injury involving fireworks.294 The tweet included an image of the
player’s hospital medical chart that confirmed the amputation.295 A federal
trial court in Florida in 2016 found that Pierre-Paul had a potentially valid
publication-of-private-facts claim: the medical chart was not publicly
available, the court decided, and medical information itself is traditionally
considered private.296 Even though the court recognized the news value in
Pierre-Paul’s potentially disabling injury alone, it found that the use of a
medical record to, in effect, prove the accuracy of the story could well
push the information past the limits of public concern.297
Both “common decency” and concern about the football player’s
“feelings . . . and the harm that will be done to him by the exposure” were
reasons the court gave for ruling as it did.298 Moreover, and key here, the
court relied in part upon “federal and state medical privacy laws [that]
signal that an individual’s medical records are generally considered
private.”299
The second case involved boxer Floyd Mayweather’s former girlfriend;
she sued him for posting to social media the allegation that she had
obtained an abortion before the couple split.300 A California appeals court
in 2017 found that the information regarding the abortion itself was
newsworthy, given that the couple was high-profile and that people would
therefore be interested in the reason for their breakup.301
Mayweather’s inclusion of a sonogram photograph, however, satisfied
the basis for a publication-of-private-facts claim.302 “On this record,” the
court wrote, “publishing those images served no legitimate public
purpose, even when one includes entertainment news within the zone of
protection.”303 Such a publication was, instead, “morbid and sensational
prying into her private life” and therefore could be the basis for a

294. Pierre-Paul v. ESPN, No. 16-21155-Civ-COOKE/TORRES, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 119597
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2016).
295. Id. at *3.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
299. Id. See also Swendrak v. Urode, B275175, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. Lexis 4010 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 12, 2017) (upholding an $825,000 verdict in favor of man whose landlord had revealed to other
tenants that police had placed him on a “psychiatric hold”).
300. Jackson v. Mayweather, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
301. Id. at 249.
302. Id. at 250.
303. Id.
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successful publication-of-private-facts claim.304 The court held that
Mayweather’s repeated posts would support in part an intentionalinfliction-of-emotional-distress claim as well.305
These, then, are not courts that are single-mindedly focused on First
Amendment-related publication rights. Instead, both courts sided with the
privacy interests of public figures in cases involving what even the courts
considered newsworthy information and favored at least initially those
interests over the publication of truthful information.
A similar sensibility exists in court decisions around the nation. In
2016, a federal court in New York, for example, rejected a request for
certain information about prison inmates in a different case, suggesting
that the requestor wrongly wanted “a piece of [the inmates’] criminal
history.”306 “[C]onfidentiality interests cannot be waived through prior
public disclosure or the passage of time,” the court advised.307 Courts in
Hawaii and New York similarly ruled in favor of plaintiffs in their privacy
lawsuits that referenced at least in part information from the past known
to others.308
A similarly inclined privacy-protective Ninth Circuit wrote in 2017 that
no per se rule exists that suggests that “one cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a conversation just because it occurs in
public.”309 “The take-home message,” the court explained, “is that privacy
304. Id. at 251 (quoting Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 366
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010)).
305. Id. at 257–58.
306. Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 11 Civ. 203 (ARR) (VMS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46455 at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2016).
307. Id. at *10 (citing Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 297 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Muchnick v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 225 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that FOIA
protects forgotten criminal history “even if scattered bits and pieces are in the public domain).
308. Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (deciding
that the plaintiff’s claim based upon the Michigan Preservation of Personal Privacy Act was valid
over Conde Nast’s arguments that if the court the publisher liable for selling and acquiring the
plaintiff’s personal data, newsgathering would be affected); Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v.
Queen’s Med. Ctr., 375 P.3d 1252 (Haw. 2016) (holding that patient records including historical
medical information regarding “the most confidential and sensitive inquiries” are deserving of privacy
and should not be produced in a third-party lawsuit); see also Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Paxton, NO. 0314-00801-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 3043, at *13 (Apr. 7, 2017) (noting in a privacy case involving
the requested release of the identities of participants in a social science experiment that certain
historical matters would be highly offensive if released and could well include “a claim for injuries
from sexual assault, a claim on behalf of illegitimate children for benefits following their father’s
death, a claim for pregnancy expenses resulting from failure of a contraceptive device, claims for
psychiatric treatment of mental disorders following workplace injuries, claims for injuries to sexual
organs, claims for injuries from an attempted suicide, and claims of disability caused by physical or
mental abuse by co-workers”).
309. Safari Club Int’l v. Rudolph, 862 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2017).
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is relative and, depending on the circumstances, one can harbor an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a public location.”310 It
held that a man had a valid privacy claim after an associate recorded their
conversation at a public restaurant and posted it to YouTube.311
That same year, a federal trial court in Massachusetts upheld the
constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited secret recording, ruling
against a “national media organization” that used “undercover
newsgathering techniques” to secretly record and intercept
communications in places “such as polling places, sidewalks, and hotel
lobbies.”312 There too the court specifically highlighted privacy concerns
in a way that echoed in part the 1890 law review article by Warren and
Brandeis:
Individuals have conversations they intend to be private, in public
spaces, where they may be overheard, all the time—they meet at
restaurants and coffee shops, talk with co-workers on the walk to
lunch, gossip with friends on the subway, and talk too loudly at
holiday parties or in restaurant booths. These types of
conversations are ones where one might expect to be overheard,
but not recorded and broadcast. There is a significant privacy
difference between overhearing a conversation in an area with no
reasonable expectation of privacy and recording and replaying
that conversation for all to hear.313
And in the case involving the hack of Ashley Madison users’
identifying information,314 the online dating service aimed at facilitating
extramarital affairs successfully protected its customers’ personal
information at trial over arguments that the information was already
public because it had been posted online.315 The court explained that the
matter “highlight[ed] the need to protect the integrity of the internet and
make it a safer place for business, research and casual use” and,
ultimately, to protect the victims of such privacy invasions.316
310. Id. at 1126.
311. Id.
312. Project Veritas Action Fund v. Conley, 244 F. Supp. 3d 256, 259 (D. Mass. 2017).
313. Id. at 264.
314. In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., MDL No. 2669, 2016 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 57619 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2016).
315. Id. at *19.
316. Id. at *21; see also Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 68 (2009)
(arguing that regulations are needed to limit the negative impacts of “online mob” activity and thereby
promote a more “vibrant online dialogue”; noting that “although much obnoxious online activity is
and should be protected, limiting online mobs’ ability to silence women, people of color, and their
other targets will, in fact, enhance the most important values underlying the First Amendment”).
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A decade ago, the Ohio State Supreme Court similarly embraced
privacy over publication.317 “[T]he barriers to generating publicity are
slight,” it wrote regarding the ease of publishing information on the
internet, “and the ethical standards regarding the acceptability of certain
discourse have been lowered.”318 It then recognized the false-light privacy
tort for the first time, a tort that other states had rejected as being too
similar to defamation but without its protections. “As the ability to do
harm has grown,” the court explained, “so must the law’s ability to protect
the innocent.”319
These interests in privacy and concern about later availability of
truthful but embarrassing information online are reflected in polls that
show that most people in the U.S. favor at least in part a Right to Be
Forgotten. A 2014 report showed that “[s]ixty-one percent of Americans
believe some version of the right to be forgotten is necessary.”320 A later
poll suggested that nearly nine out of ten people wanted the ability to
remove past embarrassing information online.321
It is not difficult to imagine these courts and these individuals and many
others like them who have embraced the importance of privacy in past
years322 favoring a plaintiff who asks for privacy against a publisher who
has dredged up and published deeply private information from the past.
D.

Dahlstrom and a Right to Be Forgotten

There is additional and surprising support for this judicial shift toward
privacy in a 2015 decision by the Seventh Circuit, Dahlstrom v. SunTimes Media, LLC.323 The court’s opinion in Dahlstrom does not address
a Right to Be Forgotten by name (although the privacy of birthdates was
at issue in the case in part), but decides something fundamental to such a
right: that those who publish private information that they have knowingly

317. Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St. 3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451, 866 N.E.2d 1051.
318. Id. at 1058–59.
319. Id. at 1059.
320. U.S. Attitudes Toward the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’, SOFTWARE ADVICE (2014),
http://www.softwareadvice.com/security/industryview/right-to-be-forgotten-2014/
[https://perma.cc/R6ND-VPCL]. The report also suggested that “[t]hirty-nine percent want a
European-style blanket right to be forgotten, without restrictions” and “[n]early half of respondents
were concerned that ‘irrelevant’ search results can harm a person’s reputation.” Id.
321. Mario Trujillo, Public Wants ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Online, HILL (Mar. 19, 2015, 9:12 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/236246-poll-public-wants-right-to-be-forgotten-online
[https://perma.cc/4S9K-FV69].
322. See numerous cases cited in GAJDA, supra note 293.
323. 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015).
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obtained from privacy-protected government files can be liable for
invasion of privacy despite the underlying truth of the information.
The Dahlstrom case, therefore, is important in two ways to any Right
to Be Forgotten. First, it holds that a publisher can be liable for the truthful
publication of what could well be described as innocuous personally
identifiable information despite considerable First Amendment protection
for more egregious publications in past Supreme Court jurisprudence.324
Second, in doing so, the decision lends strong support to the argument that
those who knowingly gather and publish information sealed by statute for
privacy reasons can be and arguably should be liable in a privacy-based
cause of action. This would include the possibility of a successful action
brought by a person whose once-secret past was revealed.
Dahlstrom concerned a Chicago Sun-Times news article that had
criticized the inclusion of certain individual police officers in a police
lineup, suggesting that investigators had chosen colleagues as ringers who
would shift attention away from the politically-well-connected suspect in
a death investigation.325 The article noted that the suspect—six-foot-three
and 230 pounds—had looked “average-sized” compared to the larger
officers who appeared in the lineup with him, even though witnesses to
the fatality under investigation had described the perpetrator as the
“tallest” and “biggest” person they had seen that night.326
It was the article’s inclusion of accurate personally identifying
information to which the police officers objected.327 One officer was
described as six-foot-three and 245 pounds; another was identified as a
forty-nine-year-old; a third was described as tattooed.328 The officers
alleged that the published information proved that the newspaper had
violated the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA)329 by
knowingly obtaining and then publishing identifying characteristics from
Illinois Secretary of State motor vehicle records, including “each officer’s
birth date, height, weight, hair color, and eye color.”330 The DPPA makes
it “unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal
information[] from a motor vehicle record.”331
324. Id. at 953–54.
325. Tim Novak and Chris Fusco, Daley Nephew Biggest Guy on Scene, but Not in Lineup,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 21, 2011, at 16.
326. Id.
327. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 939.
328. Id.
329. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–25 (2012).
330. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 939.
331. 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a).
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After the trial court rejected the journalists’ motion to dismiss, the
journalists argued in part on appeal that they had the right to publish
truthful information about the officers that they had obtained from a
government source; in making that argument, they relied in large part on
foundational Supreme Court cases that protected the publication of
government-sourced truthful information.332 The journalists argued, in
effect, that Cox Broadcasting, Florida Star, and Bartnicki all supported
them.
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the newspaper’s First
Amendment defense as had the trial court, writing in part that the
newspaper had cited to “no authority for the proposition that an entity that
acquires information by breaking the law enjoys a First Amendment right
to disseminate that information.”333 The court explained that in each
Supreme Court case cited by the newspaper—Cox Broadcasting, Florida
Star, Bartnicki—“the press’s initial acquisition of sensitive information
was lawful.”334
Indeed, as explained earlier in this Article, the Dahlstrom court’s
refusal to follow in a rote way generally media-protective Supreme Court
precedent is not at odds with language in those older cases.335 Recall how
the Court repeatedly emphasized the narrowness of its privacy-versuspress decisions.336 Noting that the government had released the
purportedly private information in most of these cases, the Court implied
that if the press had acquired information through unlawful means, its
right to publish could well diminish.337
More specifically with regard to that line of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the Seventh Circuit’s unanimous opinion suggested first
that the Justices had never conferred on media any expansive
newsgathering right, instead noting that the Court had decided that
newsgatherers must abide by generally applicable laws despite the
promise of press freedoms within the First Amendment.338 Second, the
Dahlstrom court found that the government’s interests in deterring access

332. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 950.
333. Id. (emphasis added).
334. Id.
335. See section II.A.
336. See discussion supra section II.A.1.
337. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), discussed supra in section II.A.1. There, recall
that the court specifically noted that it was a “still-open question” whether media could be liable for
the publication of information that it had acquired “unlawfully,” in contrast with that it had acquired
lawfully. Id. at 528.
338. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 946–47.
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to the drivers license database and in protecting the privacy of individuals
were important safety-related considerations sufficiently advanced by the
statute’s prohibitions.339 Even though the topic of the article itself was
important, the court decided, the value added by the inclusion of personal
information was negligible.340 Therefore, this time, privacy won out over
publication.
On remand, the trial court described the Seventh Circuit’s Dahlstrom
holding this way: the appeals court had decided that “the Sun-Times
possessed no constitutional right, either to obtain the officers’ personal
information from the motor vehicle records, or to publish the unlawfully
obtained information.”341
It is true that the Dahlstrom appeals court pointedly refused to “opine
as to whether, given a scenario involving lesser privacy concerns or
information of greater public significance, the delicate balance might tip
in favor of disclosure.”342 Instead, the court wrote:
We hold only that, where members of the press unlawfully obtain
sensitive information that, in context, is of marginal public value,
the First Amendment does not guarantee them the right to publish
that information.343
Note, however, that such a limitation is actually not so limited. Many
news stories could be considered of marginal public value344 and unlawful
behavior is not perfectly definable given the Dahlstrom facts in which the
role the journalists played in acquiring the information is not adequately
described. Moreover, note how the language in the quoted passage
supports a Right to Be Forgotten. Certainly, “sensitive information” that
is “of marginal public value” could well include information about an
individual’s past, proved private because a court or a statute had sealed it
339. Id. at 954.
340. Id. at 953.
341. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, Case No. 12 C 658, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 134227 at
*2–*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016). The court held that while there remained some question about the
newspaper’s ability to gather the information, it granted the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings about the publication itself. Id. at *9.
342. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 954.
343. Id. (emphasis added).
344. Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the
Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1076 n.230 (2009) (offering an example from a 2006 case in which
“a federal district court was openly skeptical about journalists’ news choices in a defamation case in
which it compared the ‘convincing’ public interest topic of consumer issues with news reports of
‘celebrity marriages and divorces, waterskiing squirrels, exploding whales, and national anthem
singing tryouts,’ refusing to accept the media defendant’s broad definition for ‘newsworthy’” (citing
Englert v. MacDonnell, No. 05-1863-AA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29361, at *20–21 (D. Or. May 10,
2006))).
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from public access on privacy grounds. If members of the press
“unlawfully” obtain such information, then, in the Dahlstrom court’s own
words, “the First Amendment does not guarantee them the right to publish
that information” if it is “of marginal public value,”345 a determination that
under the Dahlstrom facts appears to defy the news judgment of the
journalists themselves.
Take juvenile criminal records, for example, and the laws that prohibit
public access to those that are sealed or expunged. Under Dahlstrom, it
would seem that the knowing access and publication of such information,
especially years-old information, could conceivably lead to liability if the
“delicate balance” between privacy and public interest at issue weighs
more heavily in favor of privacy as earlier Supreme Court precedent
suggests that it might.346 Such information may have been long since
forgotten by most and the public interest in it would arguably be negligible
in many cases. The individual, moreover, would likely argue that he has
a strong privacy interest in his juvenile criminal record, given the
economic and emotional dangers of disclosure. Compare in contrast the
information published by the Sun-Times regarding the police officers:
birthdates, physical characteristics, and other identifying information that
is arguably not private at all and without any seeming potential to harm
the officer’s future livelihood other than through identifiability as an
officer. Nonetheless, in Dahlstrom it was protectable on privacy grounds
because a statute mandated as much.
Any lawsuit based upon the publication of older, expunged criminal
records seems a stronger argument for privacy protections—and a proplaintiff outcome, therefore, appears at least possible under Dahlstrom.
E.

Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Statutes

Given Dahlstrom’s reliance on a privacy-based statute to punish
newsgathering and publication by journalists, Right to Be Forgotten ideals
in statutory law across the United States are relevant: statutes that protect
truthful, older information on privacy grounds seemingly could, postDahlstrom, become the basis for liability in privacy-focused lawsuits
should the historical information be revealed by a publisher.
Consider the relevance of such statutes to the two key parts of a privacy
cause of action. The first is the distinction between what is public and
what is private. If once-public information has been sealed, the argument
would be that such information has become private, especially if the
345. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 954.
346. Id.
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information is older and long forgotten. Second, if truthful information
that is “morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake”
and of no interest to a decent person exceeds the bounds of what is
appropriate news,347 statutes that protect certain historic information can
help establish what is morbid and sensational and outside decency
standards. In this way, newsworthiness is, in part, some might argue,
curated by legislatures that protect certain truthful information by placing
it outside the bounds of what is properly revealed. Society has spoken, the
argument would go, and certain information is therefore appropriately off
limits.
This is in part what occurred in the Jason Pierre-Paul case against
ESPN described earlier.348 There, the court relied on “federal and state
medical privacy laws. . . [that] signal that an individual’s medical records
are generally considered private.”349 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, therefore, helped to establish that ESPN’s use of a
medical chart was beyond the bounds of what was appropriate news.
In other words, as some courts have suggested,350 forbidding access to,
providing for the destruction of, or providing criminal liability for
someone who releases particular historical information may provide a
means for laws to force society to “forget” that information. By doing so,
the argument would go, they also can help establish what is appropriately
newsworthy, at least in some sense.
It is clear that such statutes, of course, cannot draw the newsworthiness
line in all circumstances. Consider, for example, the secrecy in years-old
tax records, a subject highly relevant in 2018, given President Donald
Trump’s continuing refusal to reveal his tax returns.351 Some who work at
the Internal Revenue Service have access to politicians’ and celebrities’
current and older tax returns, and many journalists and members of the
public would very much like to learn what is in them.
And while news value seems absolutely clear in the situation involving
President Trump, federal law mandates confidentiality of this older
financial information. The Internal Revenue Code reads that no officer,

347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. H (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
348. Pierre-Paul v. ESPN, Inc., Case No. 16-21156-Civ-COOKE/TORRES, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 119597 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2016).
349. Id. at *3; see also Swendrak v. Urode, B275175, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4010 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 12, 2017) (upholding an $825,000 verdict in favor of man whose landlord had revealed
to other tenants that police had placed him on a “psychiatric hold”).
350. See, e.g., Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015).
351. See, e.g., Billy House, “Trump Will Not Release Taxes; Senior Adviser Says People Don’t
Care About Tax Returns Of First Billionaire President,” PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 23, 2017.
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federal or state employee, law enforcement official, agency official, or
anyone with access to tax returns “shall disclose any return or return
information obtained by him in any manner.”352 Under Dahlstrom and
Pierre-Paul, given these longstanding statutory privacy interests, the
possibility exists that a court might find the revelation of tax returns in a
case not involving a politician to be sufficiently private and insufficiently
newsworthy to merit free press protections.
Consider as a broader example Tennessee’s “Confidential Records”
statute,353 one that suggests a right to privacy in much past historical
information. The statute provides that medical records,354 military
records,355 school records,356 children’s services records,357 motor vehicle
records,358 mental health files,359 records that would identify those
involved in executions,360 photographs of rape victims,361 among multiple
others, are protected. All are “treated as confidential and shall not be open
for inspection by members of the public.”362 Multiple additional states
have similarly protective statutes.363
These statutes do not promise a Right to Be Forgotten in any direct
sense; they do not offer or even suggest Right to Be Forgotten invasionof-privacy causes of action by their language. But what they do promise
is a clear level of confidentiality in certain records, up to total destruction
of those records, and, given Dahlstrom, the very real possibility that
someone could well sue on privacy grounds based upon them should such
information be revealed.
1.

Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Statutes and Children

Perhaps the most privacy-protective of these statutes are those
concerning the past lives of children, especially with regard to their
criminal histories. In Tennessee and many other states, childhood criminal
352. I.R.C § 6103(a) (2012).
353. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504 (2017).
354. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(1).
355. Id. § 10-7-504 (a)(3).
356. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(4).
357. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(8).
358. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(12).
359. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(13)(A).
360. Id. § 10-7-504(h)(1).
361. Id. § 10-7-504(q)(1)(E).
362. E.g., id. § 10-7-504(a).
363. See MINN. STAT. § 626.556 Subd. 11c (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-216(1) (2017); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-2901 (2017).
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records are strongly protected.364 In Montana, a statute orders the physical
sealing of juvenile criminal records when the individual turns eighteen,365
and it contemplates the complete “destruction of records” of youth court
records more generally.366
In North Dakota, fingerprint records and photographs of an arrested
child must be destroyed.367 After that, the statute mandates that the
government act as if the record had never existed:
Upon the final destruction of a file or record, the proceeding must
be treated as if it never occurred . . . [and] [u]pon inquiry in any
matter the child, the court, and representatives of
agencies . . . shall properly reply that no record exists with
respect to the child.368
In Minnesota, state officials are forbidden from releasing juvenile
offender records and from acknowledging that such records exist.369 There
too juvenile records “must be destroyed” instantly or later, depending
upon the case outcome and the severity of the crime.370 Photographs of
children are to be destroyed when the children turn nineteen.371 Relatedly,
if a school in Minnesota receives a disposition order from the police, that
information “must be destroyed” when the student graduates and any data
about the incident must be “delete[d].”372 In addition, a child’s blood
samples and the child’s test results for certain disorders “must be
destroyed.”373
Consider too the privacy in many states surrounding the adoption
process and how it, in effect, changes historical fact to ensure that certain
individuals are forgotten. In Alabama, as in many states, once a child is
adopted, a new birth certificate is issued containing the names of the
adoptive parents and the original birth certificate is sealed.374 In Kentucky,
the new birth certificate may not indicate the location of the hospital or

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504(a)(8).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-216(1).
Id. § 41-5-216(3).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-53(4) (2017).
Id. § 27-20-54(2).
MINN. STAT. § 299C.095 Subd. 1(b) (2017).
Id. Subd. 2 (b)–(e).
MINN. STAT. § 260B.171 Subd. 1(c) (2017).
MINN. STAT. § 121A.75 Subd. 2(e), 3(e) (2017).
MINN. STAT. § 144.125 Subd. 8(b) (2017).
ALA. CODE § 26-10A-32 (2017).
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any attending medical professional and any adoption information may not
be disclosed by anyone with access to those “locked” files.375
2.

Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Statutes and Adults

There are statutes that protect similarly private information regarding
adults, some of which order the total destruction of information. In South
Carolina, for example, all photographs, videos, electronic files, and other
evidence at issue in an eavesdropping or voyeurism case “must be
destroyed” in order to protect the victim’s privacy.376
In California, as in many states, a new birth certificate is issued when
an individual requests a different name and gender; the new birth
certificate must not refer in any way to any older name or gender.377 In
2015, the state passed a law that forces websites to remove posts by
teenagers who later regret what they’ve posted,378 a law with strong Right
to Be Forgotten implications.379 Another more criticized California law
forced websites such as IMDb to remove anyone’s birthdate if that person
requested such a removal, allowing in effect the erasure of accurate
historical information.380 In Mississippi, abortion records are sealed and
disclosure of related information is a felony.381 In West Virginia, any
information regarding certain doctors’ drug or alcohol dependency “shall
be expunged from the individual’s historic record.”382
Relatedly, and in line with cases described earlier in this Article, an
adult’s criminal past is also at times protected. In Connecticut, criminal
records are erased and any person in control of those records “shall not
disclose to anyone their existence or any information pertaining to any
375. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.570 (West 2018). A court can order disclosure, however, under
very limited circumstances.
376. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470(f) (2017).
377. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103430 (West 2017).
378. Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 22.1.22580 (West 2017).
379. But see Lawrence Siry, Forget Me, Forget Me Not: Reconciling Two Different Paradigms of
the Right to Be Forgotten, 103 KY. L.J. 311, 333–34 (2014) (discussing this California legislation in
relation to the Right to Be Forgotten, but noting that it is rather limited in its applications, “given that
the wording of the provision only seems to cover individuals who post material and request its
removal before they turn eighteen”).
380. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83.5 (West 2017). A federal trial court later preliminarily blocked its
implementation on First Amendment grounds. Imdb.com v. Becerra, Case No. 16-cv-06535-VC,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017).
381. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-77 (2017). Abortion record confidentiality exists in multiple states.
See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-445 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7.1 (2017).
382. W. VA. CODE § 30-14-11a (2017).
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charge” that was erased.383 There, any record of a crime later
decriminalized, such as the crime of sodomy, shall be “physically
destroyed.”384 In Massachusetts, material involving a police warrant must
be destroyed after five years.385 In South Carolina, once a criminal record
is expunged, the individual’s arrest records, bench warrants, mug shots,
and fingerprints are kept under seal and then “must be destroyed and no
evidence” be retained.386 Those who violate that law are guilty of a
misdemeanor.387 There are similar provisions in Louisiana.388 In Florida,
a law that will take effect in 2018 forces any websites that request payment
for the removal of mugshots to remove a mugshot if the individual makes
a request by certified letter.389
Consider too statutes that protect photographs and other graphic
information obtained during autopsies. In a preliminary draft of a Florida
state law, the legislature called it a “public necessity” that much autopsy
information be kept confidential, lest “highly sensitive depictions or
descriptions of the deceased” cause surviving family “continuous”
emotional injury, including “memory of the deceased.”390 In Michigan,
there is a prohibition on public display of autopsy photographs.391
In Minnesota, records from license plate readers must be destroyed
after 60 days; the statute’s subtitle is “Destruction of data required.”392
And, in Illinois, police body camera footage must be destroyed after
ninety days.393 All of this material would, of course, indicate precisely
where people were in the past, their interpersonal connections, and at
times even what they said—and would help prove what had happened in
the past, but also deeply implicate privacy.
But perhaps the most interesting and relevant example is located in the
federal statute that covers bankruptcy credit reporting. The U.S. Code
mandates that no bankruptcy can appear on an individual’s credit report
once a decade has passed.394 This means, in effect, that a credit agency is
383. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a (2017).
384. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142d; see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105 (West 2017),
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101 (2017).
385. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(N)(3) (West 2017).
386. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-1-40(b)(1) (2017).
387. Id. § 17-1-40(c)(4).
388. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 973 (2017).
389. S.B. 118, 2017 Leg. (Fla. 2017) (enacted June 16, 2017, to take effect in July 2018).
390. H.B. 1083, 2001 Leg. (Fla. 2001).
391. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2855a (2017).
392. MINN. STAT. § 13.824 Subd. 3(a) (2017).
393. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-20(a)(7)(B) (2017).
394. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1) (2012).
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forced to forget about the historical fact of bankruptcy even though such
information would likely be of significant interest to anyone who
requested such a report. Instead, it seems, privacy protects the individual
who has turned around his financially troubled life.
That, at least in some small and partial way, reflects precisely what the
European Court of Justice decided in 2014 when it ruled that a man’s tenyear-old debt proceedings should be wiped off Google on privacy
grounds: that individuals deserve a right to redemption that is only
possible through a Right to Be Forgotten-like mandate.
3.

How Privacy-Protective Statutes Interact with a Right to Be
Forgotten

Given Dahlstrom, any one of these statutes that protects privacy by at
times literally ordering the destruction of a source of older truthful
information could become the basis for a Right to Be Forgotten-like
publication-of-private-facts claim against media.
Indeed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court suggested in 2016 in dicta
that annulled arrests could perhaps be categorized as “files whose
disclosure would constitute invasion of privacy” given Right to Be
Forgotten-relevant statutory protection.395 And the Wisconsin Supreme
Court that same year relied in part on a crime victims’ rights statute to
withhold access to a training video that included the discussion of a longago crime; in siding with the privacy of the victims, it explained that the
“exposure of [the crime victims’] identities almost a decade after [the]
events occurred” would lead to emotional trauma and suffering, even
though the information was once public knowledge.396
Finally, in 2014, in a case involving an ACLU request for prosecution
data, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit linked
statutory law and privacy rights. After citing a number of criminal history
erasure statutes, it wrote: “we reject the . . . surrender of any reasonable
expectation of privacy to the Internet—a surrender that would appear to
result from a failure to distinguish between the mere ability to access
information and the likelihood of actual public focus on that

395. Grafton Cty. Attorney’s Office v. Canner, 147 A.3d 410, 413 (N.H. 2016) (quoting the trial
court). The court had decided that records of annulled arrests were not categorically exempt from
public inspection. Id. “[O]ur decision today,” it wrote, “does not resolve the question of whether the
records related to [the unnamed individual’s] arrest and prosecution ultimately will be available for
public inspection.” Id.
396. Democratic Party of Wisc. v. Wisc. Dep’t of Justice, 888 N.W.2d 584 (Wis. 2016).
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information.”397 In other words, the court suggested that there is indeed
privacy in older public information that is otherwise available on the
internet—and that the statutes help provide support for the right to privacy
of the individual. In even more relevant Right to Be Forgotten language,
it added:
Although the fact that such defendants were accused of criminal
conduct may remain a matter of public record, they are entitled to
move on with their lives without having the public reminded of
their alleged but never proven transgressions.398
The statutes highlighted in this section, each of which help to protect
truthful information from the past in some key way, help support the
notion that there is some historical information that deserves some level
of protection from publication. Given Dahlstrom’s holding that a privacyfocused statute can become the basis for an invasion-of-privacy claim
even against the mainstream media, any one of these statutes could lead
to a litigated Right to Be Forgotten-based clash between press rights and
privacy rights.
F.

Hassell v. Bird and the Order to Remove

Finally, there has been some suggestion in the United States that
websites—even those not liable for publishing the offending
information—might be forced to remove offending information from the
internet. This too parallels at least in part the Google Spain decision.
Consider the 2016 California appeals court decision that ordered Yelp
to remove defamatory reviews a user had posted. Hassell v. Bird399
involved a defamation claim filed by a law firm against a former client
who had posted “factual inaccuracies and defamatory remarks” about its
representation.400 The trial court judge eventually awarded the law firm
nearly $558,000 and, as a part of its decision, ordered Yelp to remove “all
reviews” by the defendant “and any subsequent comments” within seven
days.401 Yelp argued in turn that the Communications Decency Act
Section 230 protected it.402 Section 230 mandates that “[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
397. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 750 F.3d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(emphasis in original).
398. Id.
399. 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
400. Id. at 209.
401. Id. at 211.
402. Id. at 224 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)).
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speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”403 Put simply, Section 230 protects websites that post
information, such as comments and reviews, generated by non-affiliated
others.404
But the California appeals court rejected Yelp’s argument.405
“Assuming, as Yelp has maintained, that Yelp played no role in the
creation of that defamatory speech,” the court wrote, “an order directing
Yelp to remove only those reviews that are covered by the injunction does
not impose any liability on Yelp.”406 Here, the court reasoned, the plaintiff
had not filed any claims against Yelp itself and the court had not found
Yelp liable for the posts.407 Instead, it asked only that Yelp remove the
defamatory information at issue: “[t]he removal order,” the court
reasoned, “simply sought to control the perpetuation of judicially declared
defamatory statements,” not liability for those statements, and, therefore,
did not violate the CDA.408
The California Supreme Court has agreed to review the decision.409
Even if it is eventually reversed, however, it signals some judicial
acceptance for removal orders despite traditionally strong CDA protection
for websites. Even though the case involved defamatory speech, truthful
but similarly tortious privacy-invading speech could one day become the
subject of a similar court order.
Moreover, the European Court of Justice will likely soon decide
another Right to Be Forgotten case that could arguably give EU courts the
power to order greater removal of what they deem to be privacy-invading
information.410 In the case, France has argued that Google should be
forced to remove links to older embarrassing information throughout the
world, including searches done in non-EU countries like the United
States; France has argued that one simply needs to use internet protocol
address-masking software in Europe to access information that had been
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 227.
406. Id. at 226.
407. Id. at 226–27.
408. Id. at 226–27.
409. Oral argument in the case is set for April 3, 2018. Oral Argument Calendar Los Angeles
Session April 3 and 4, 2018, SUP. CT. CAL. (Mar. 8, 2018) http://www.courts.ca.gov/
documents/calendars/SAPR0318.PDF. [https://perma.cc/BR8A-6A7Q].
410. Alex Hern, ECJ to Rule on Whether ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Can Stretch Beyond EU,
GUARDIAN (July 20, 2017, 5:19 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/20/ecjruling-google-right-to-be-forgotten-beyond-eu-france-data-removed
[https://perma.cc/K4Q7-6K
ZK].
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ordered removed there and that such a broad power of removal is,
therefore, needed.411
Given these arguments and this continuing level of court interest, the
Right to Be Forgotten has the potential to continue to expand
internationally.
III. THE RIGHT SORT OF RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN: A
CLEARER FOCUS ON NEWSWORTHINESS
Recall that when the European Court of Justice decided that individuals
have a Right to Be Forgotten by recognizing that some information about
one’s past should remain private and by forcing search engines like
Google to remove certain links about what it considered the irrelevant
past, commenters were often skeptical that such a Right could ever
constitutionally exist in the United States.412 This Article warns that the
Right to Be Forgotten in a normative sense has both significant historical
and modern support here.
This Article also warns that Right to Be Forgotten sensibilities will
become increasingly tempting to judges who find a growing need for
privacy protections today—a time in which hurtful truthful information
about individuals can arguably be kept forever in computerized memory
and can be made available anytime with a click. For example, not long
after the European Court of Justice decision, one judge opined that, that a
Right to Be Forgotten in the United States could effectively work to
punish the privacy-invading information that would otherwise be
protected by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,413 the law
described in the previous section414 that nearly uniformly protects internet
publishers from liability for others’ posts. 415 He may not be correct in a
legal sense, given the broad nature of CDA protection, but his excitement
about a workaround indicates not only a desire among some judges for
lessened protection for publishers but also the sense that a Right to Be
Forgotten has merit in the United States.
411. Id.
412. For a detailed comparative examination of notions of privacy in the U.S. and Europe, see
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J.
1151 (2004).
413. Mike Masnick, NY Judge Laments the Lack of a ‘Right to Be Forgotten’; Suggests New Law
Fix That, TECHDIRT (Dec. 23, 2014, 10:27 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141220/
07184429490/ny-judge-laments-lack-right-to-be-forgotten-suggests-new-laws-fix-that.shtml
[https://perma.cc/Y36B-W3X8].
414. See supra section II.F.
415. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2012).
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The Right is indeed tempting. Science has proved, for example, that
young people’s brains do not fully mature until long after most create
social media accounts on which some post personal information that could
later be of embarrassment; many seemingly believe that no one but friends
will be interested readers.416 As noted in a preceding section,417 we often
protect statutorily older criminal and other records through sealing or
through total destruction, recognizing that preventing access to such
material gives an individual the ability to right the wrongs of a past life
with at least partial assurance that such information is strongly protected
by the state. It may seem a strong argument that what has once been made
public on the internet can no longer be private, but one need only read of
the suicides of young people when privacy-intrusive videos become
public418 to recognize that the law must ensure that some material is never
seen again.
Consider the dangers that a Right to Be Forgotten presents to freedom
of the press, however. If one’s long-past criminal history is in fact private,
a blanket Right would arguably give a budding politician the ability to
hide the past, not only by preventing access to relevant records, but by
threatening a lawsuit should a publication wish to report what those
records contain. If Cox Broadcasting, Florida Star, and Bartnicki are read
broadly enough and if the information is deemed private enough, it would
not matter that the publisher had acquired the information legally, as long
as a court found such information to be private.
A Right to Be Forgotten without clear limits therefore, gives too much
power to the individual’s privacy interests over the interests of the public
and the freedom of the press to report key information about the powerful.
I very strongly favor press interests over privacy interests in these
clashes because I understand both that news can be emotionally painful
and that ethical journalists work hard to balance effectively publication
with the privacy rights of individuals. Even so, given the unfettered
publishing ability of those without ethics constraints, there seems to be
416. I have previously described a teenager who freely identified herself by name and address and
then proceeded to post medical and other deeply personal information on a message board for college
hopefuls. When her peers suggested that she not be so open, she confidently suggested that no one
else would be reading. It was only after her college counselor suggested that she leave the message
board that she stopped posting. For related discussion of social media, see Elizabeth A. Kirley, Can
Digital Speech Loosen the Gordian Knot of Reputation Law?, 32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 171
(2015) and Roberta Studwell, The Notion and Practice of Reputation and Professional Identity in
Social Networking: From K-12 Through Law School, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 225 (2016).
417. See supra section II.E.
418. See, e.g., Jamie Schram, Beauty Kills Herself After Sex Tape Goes Viral, N.Y. POST (Sept. 15,
2016, 1:29 PM), https://nypost.com/2016/09/15/beauty-kills-herself-after-sex-tape-goes-viral/
[https://perma.cc/4B7H-DHR9]; Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide: Two College Roommates, a
Webcam, and a Tragedy, NEW YORKER, Feb. 6, 2012, at 37.
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increasing need for some level of privacy protection that recognizes and
supports human dignity interests. This lends strong support for a
balancing test that gives substantial and nearly all-powerful weight to
press interests but still acknowledges the very real harm that can come
from certain truthful revelations.
Indeed, there is some support for this sort of balance even at the highest
levels of journalism. After the Right to Be Forgotten decision from the
European Court of Justice, the New York Times editorial board suggested
not that the Right be flatly rejected in the United States, but that any
adoption of such a Right be tempered:
The desire to allow individuals to erase data that they no longer
wish to disclose is understandable. For example, there are good
reasons to let people remove embarrassing photos and posts they
published on social media as children or young adults. But
lawmakers should not create a right so powerful that it could limit
press freedoms or allow individuals to demand that lawful
information in a news archive be hidden.419
The New York Times is correct, of course, that any Right to Be
Forgotten should necessarily be limited. And its suggestion that the focus
be on “lawful” information contained within a “news archive” seems to
suggest that even it agrees that some illegally obtained, not newsworthy
stored material should be subject to removal from the internet.
Recall how that idea at least in part parallels in a normative sense the
language of the Restatement and its balance between the right to privacy
and the right of the press to publish newsworthy information. Much of
liability there is dependent upon when the event at issue occurred, what it
involved, and who it concerned: Restatement authors suggest that when
the publication becomes “morbid and sensational prying . . . for its own
sake,” liability is appropriate because such information has no true news
value;420 that some historical information, even about a past crime, has
privacy protection; and that those in the public eye are less deserving of
privacy.421
In any Right to Be Forgotten analysis, then, a definition for
newsworthiness that considers those when-what-who questions
necessarily forces courts to balance competing interests—privacy and
press—and not decide categorically that all long ago crimes and other

419. Editorial, Ordering Google to Forget, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at A26.
420. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. H (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
421. Id.
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historical information are due privacy or that all revelations about the past
are protected because of press freedom.
Importantly, these are the same sorts of when-what-who questions
frequently asked by journalists to help gauge the news value of historical
information.422 When did the historical incident occur? The greater the
length of time between the past event and present day, usually the less
newsworthy the matter.423 What did the historical incident entail? The
privacy-relevant nature of the information at issue matters, given that
journalism’s ethics codes dictate that some things, such as graphic sexual
information, are nearly universally off-limits.424 Who is the person
involved? The status of the individual at issue can dictate the level of
invasiveness of coverage, with private individuals given greater
protection than public figures who are accustomed to, and at times strive
for, the limelight.425
Consider too the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics and
its section titled “Minimize Harm” as additional when-what-who
guidance.426 The section begins by encouraging journalists to weigh the
“public[] need” of certain information against the “harm or discomfort”
that might be brought should the information be revealed.427 “Weigh the
consequences of publishing or broadcasting personal information,” the
Code later advises.428 It also distinguishes between those who are in the
public eye and those who are not, suggesting that “private people have a
greater right to control information about themselves than public figures
and others who seek power, influence or attention.”429 Perhaps most
relevant here, it also suggests that journalists “[c]onsider the long-term
implications of the extended reach and permanence of publication.”430
In other words, ethical journalists, in their quest to “treat[] sources,
subjects, colleagues and members of the public as human beings
422. See JAMES G. STOVALL, JOURNALISM: WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND HOW (Karon
Bowers & Molly Taylor eds., 2005).
423. See id. at 5–6 (discussing timeliness as an important factor that determines whether a story is
newsworthy).
424. See id. at 473–74 (discussing the journalistic ethical code regarding the privacy concerns of
the individuals journalists cover).
425. See id. at 6 (discussing the prominence of the subject as an important factor that determines
whether a story is newsworthy).
426. SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF’L JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM),
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp [https://perma.cc/3H45-TKXV].
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
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deserving of respect,”431 must balance the when, the what, and the who,
not only in drafting a story, but in deciding whether to publish the story
in the first place. It is only when that balance tips in favor of publication
over privacy—recall the “public[] need” language in the “Minimize
Harm” section432—that journalism ethics would support the story.
This is not to suggest that there is or should be or can ever be a brightline journalism ethics test that courts should use should they begin to
embrace even more clearly and strongly a Right to Be Forgotten—or even
that such ethics language should ever be used by courts. Such a use would
decidedly chill an already economically constricted and restricted press
corps. Moreover, as I have written previously, journalism’s ethics
provisions are meant to be aspirational and often times conflict, given the
highly fact-dependent and malleable nature of news judgment; they
certainly are not rules that force certain behaviors and they can be
extremely dangerous as a limitation on press freedoms if used by a court
as a basis for liability.433 But it is of at least some small interest that, in
certain cases, the privacy protection suggested by the Restatement aligns
nearly exactly with that suggested by journalists themselves.
It is also of some interest that the Associated Press Stylebook, a bible
of sorts for journalists, instructs users in part that the publication-ofprivate-facts tort has newsworthiness considerations and then includes
two examples that involve Right to Be Forgotten-like claims: one
springing from Melvin v. Reid, the case involving the once-prostitute who
had changed her ways, and a second involving a published photograph of
an accident scene taken twenty months earlier and featuring a child
victim.434 In that second example, the authors suggest the court found
liability for publication because “the child was no longer ‘in the news.’”435
Describing the legal line of newsworthiness as “not always clear” in
cases involving the use of historical material, the authors of the Stylebook
suggest that there must be some connection between the private fact that
is revealed and the news value inherent in the story in order for the
journalist to escape liability:
Even in the context of a report on a plainly newsworthy topic, the
disclosure of a highly embarrassing private fact may give rise to
a claim for invasion of privacy if the facts are not logically related
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Gajda, supra note 344.
434. ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK 2015 AND BRIEFING ON MEDIA
LAW 358–59 (David Minthorn, Sally Jacobsen & Paula Froke eds., 2015).
435. Id.
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to the matter of public concern. For example, disclosure of the
intimate sexual practices of a celebrity might support a claim for
invasion of privacy if it were unrelated to any newsworthy report
and amounted to prying into someone’s life for its own sake.436
The information in the Stylebook is meant to be a primer on media law
for journalists, and is certainly not any sort of liability admission, but it is
nonetheless interesting that Right to Be Forgotten-like decisions are those
highlighted and chosen out of many to help guide news coverage.
But this nod from journalism toward this sort of privacy requires a
strong counterbalance. A protected and therefore vigorous press promotes
public knowledge and ultimately democracy through ambitious
reporting;437 journalists need solid protection all the more in the current
climate in which President Trump has condemned mainstream, highly
ethical journalism as “fake news.”438
A newsworthiness argument that I have made previously has some
value here.439 First, I have argued that any truthful publication—
information that would be at the core of any Right to Be Forgotten-type
claim—should be presumed newsworthy.440 Such a presumption would
necessarily limit publishers’ liability in publication-of-private-facts and
similar tort cases and make it easy for them to win on an a motion to
dismiss.
Liability would be possible and a jury would therefore hear only those
“truly exceptional cases,” in which a judge believed that a reasonable jury
could in fact find that “the degradation of human dignity caused by the
disclosure [had] clearly outweighed the public’s interest in the
disclosure.”441 Under such a test, successful privacy lawsuits would spring
436. Id.
437. See Robert Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten,
and the Construction of the Public Sphere 73 (Apr. 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the author) (providing a historical overview of the role of the press in our democracy and noting that
“[e]very democratic state extends constitutional protections to the media ‘not for the benefit of the
press so much as for the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the
maintenance of our political system and an open society’” (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
389 (1967))).
438. See, e.g., Louis Nelson, Trump Again Attacks New York Times as ‘Fake News Joke!’,
POLITICO (June 28, 2017, 7:34 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/28/donald-trumptwitter-media-fake-news-240036 [https://perma.cc/W6L9-47JU?type=image].
439. Gajda, supra note 293.
440. Id. at 233.
441. Id. For other approaches to these questions, see, e.g., Sonja R. West, The Story of Us:
Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical Speech and Information Privacy, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 589, 589–90 (2010) (arguing that courts should place a greater focus on the “offensiveness”
element of the publication of private facts tort in determining whether speech deserves First
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only from the publication of intensely private material traditionally kept
private because of a strongly intimate nature or deeply personal focus—
information such as graphic depictions of sexual activity, nudity, and
deeply private and highly sensitive medical information, for example.442
Language from the Seventh Circuit’s Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.443
decision is helpful here: privacy should protect only “those intimate
physical details the publicizing of which would be not merely
embarrassing and painful but deeply shocking to the average person
subjected to such exposure.”444
A Right to Be Forgotten-based privacy tort claim would therefore
rarely be successful under such a test, given that all truthful information—
including information that is older and non-public—would be presumed
newsworthy.445 It would only be in that exceptional case in which the
dignity interests of the plaintiff clearly outweighed the public interest in
the published material that the plaintiff would have the ability to take his
Right to Be Forgotten-based claim to a jury and perhaps win.446
Moreover, this sort of pro-publication test would be nearly
insurmountable for a public official, given that privacy law already allows
deeper inquiry into such an individual’s private life.
There will be difficult Right to Be Forgotten-relevant cases, however.
Consider, for example, the Austrian woman who is said to have sued her
parents for posting on social media multiple naked images of her while
Amendment protection) and Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 975–76 (2003) (arguing that courts should draw
an analogy between these questions and the law of evidence, in which some information is admissible
for certain purposes but not others; thereby positing that in determining the propriety of disclosures
of information, courts should examine the purpose for which the disclosure is being made).
442. Gajda, supra note 293. For a somewhat different take on the matter, see Ioanna Tourkochoriti,
Speech, Privacy, and Dignity in France and in the U.S.A.: A Comparative Analysis, 38 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP L. REV. 217, 253 (2016) (noting the problematic nature of these determinations of
what is private because “[t]he legal category of ‘highly offensive’ facts creates difficulties of
interpretation concerning concepts to be determined by the judge ad hoc”).
443. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
444. Id. at 1234–35.
445. Consider here the persuasive language in Haynes v. Knopf, that favors publication over
privacy: “[p]ainful though it is for the [plaintiffs] to see a past they would rather forget brought into
the public view, the public needs the information conveyed by the book [at issue in the case] in order
to evaluate the profound social and political questions that the book raises.” Id. at 1233. That case
involved the publication of somewhat mundane but otherwise not publicly known information,
including alcohol use and spending practices, that the author used to illustrate in a journalistic sense
what the court called the urban ghetto.
446. There are additional nuances important to the question here to be sure. Any Right to Be
Forgotten would necessarily involve information that was in fact private and not publicly known or
there could be no privacy claim.
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she was growing up.447 In the United States, parents have posted personal
and potentially harmful information about their children, including mental
illness diagnoses that could affect their later employment and life plans.448
When those children become adults, should they have the ability to sue
should someone reveal this once-public information? Do these nowadults, who had no control as children over the revelations by their
parents, have the right to erase this truthful but potentially harmful
information?449 Should they, in effect, have a Right to Be Forgotten?
While these questions and their answers may be difficult, what is clear
is that there is support for some sort of a Right to Be Forgotten in privacy
jurisprudence and statutory law in the United States that could
conceivably help them win such a case.
Given that, a weighted balance between these important and competing
interests—one that strongly supports news judgment and journalism itself
by presuming the newsworthiness of truthful information but also protects
privacy in exceptional cases—is one suitable answer.450
CONCLUSION
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit wrote in a copyright case that a Right to Be
Forgotten “is not recognized in the United States.”451 This Article has
argued that that widely assumed conclusion is wrong. The Right to Be
Forgotten—the right to have some level of privacy in some parts of one’s
past—exists in a normative sense, if not by name, by strong implication
in the United States in common law, in the Restatement, and in statutes.
And it has since the early 1800s.
447. Ashley May, 18-Year-Old Sues Parents for Posting Baby Pictures on Facebook, USA TODAY
(Sept. 16, 2016, 11:11 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/09/16/18-yearold-sues-parents-posting-baby-pictures-facebook/90479402/ [https://perma.cc/8VG7-6JBG].
448. Adrienne LaFrance, The Perils of ‘Sharenting’, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/babies-everywhere/502757/
[https://perma.cc/2RBV-KL6T] (noting that “[s]omeone might blog about a child’s medical condition
as a way to seek or offer support, or to raise crucial funds for health care”).
449. For a greater exploration of this issue, see Stacey B. Steinberg, Sharenting: Children’s Privacy
in the Age of Social Media, 66 EMORY L.J. 839 (2017) (examining the inherent conflict between
parents’ rights to free speech and children’s present and future interest in privacy and control of their
digital identities and exploring potential legal solutions to this conflict).
450. Such a balance may value press rights too strongly for some, but consider one very troubling
alternative that favors privacy too strongly. In 2016, an Italian court attempted to ensure even greater
privacy in the past by ordering that news stories expire from online databases after a period of two
years. Athalie Matthews, How Italian Courts Used the Right to Be Forgotten to Put an Expiry Date
on News, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:12 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/
sep/20/how-italian-courts-used-the-right-to-be-forgotten-to-put-an-expiry-date-on-news
[https://perma.cc/K73C-CWZ5].
451. Garcia v. Google, Inc. 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
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The question now is how to cabin a Right to Be Forgotten effectively
in a way that strongly and nearly always supports press freedoms but also
recognizes those very limited times in which exposure of the past
implicates individual privacy in a significant way. A balancing test that
presumes newsworthiness except in very rare cases respects the privacy
and dignity of the individual, and prevents a debilitating chilling effect on
journalism’s truthful reporting.

